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ABSTRACT 
Currently government and public health are drafting emergency response 
plans regarding biological events (man-made & natural) that include 
responsibilities for law enforcement.  Yet, police officers are unaccustomed to 
working with biological agents or responding to biological incidents, and have 
little if any experience in this area.  Therefore, their expectations and concerns 
are unknown and their willingness to respond is untested.  Through the use of 
focus groups, officers were asked questions about their thoughts and concerns 
regarding responding to a bio-incident.  The focus groups consisted of over forty 
police officers, from more than five different agencies in the National Capitol 
Region. 
The results of the research demonstrate that most police officers are 
willing to respond to a biological incident; however, they expect that their families 
will be properly cared for by their agency, which presents a problem if there is no 
vaccine available.  Other areas that were explored were the officers’ expectations 
of the public and of their respective agencies in a bio-incident.  The research 
concludes with recommendations regarding ways to prepare the public to have 
realistic expectations of law enforcement, the need to create a Family Support 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A.   PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Currently, local and state governments are drafting bio-disaster plans for 
use in the event of a bio-terrorist attack or natural pandemic.  Historically, 
government officials have relied on quarantine as the main method of 
containment to prevent the spread of disease during these events.  The last, 
large-scale pandemic episode in the United States was in 1918, when 500,000 
people died during a worldwide influenza outbreak that killed 50 million.1  
Quarantine was used to stop the spread of disease in 1918.  However, in 
today’s society there are many practical, political and ethical concerns about the 
use of quarantine.2  The public has come to expect the government to provide for 
and take care of them in the event of a natural or man-made disaster.  
Simultaneously, the public also expects the government to respect and protect 
their civil liberties.  These often conflicting expectations – effective care and 
protection of liberties – place significant challenges on governments as they plan 
for bio-disasters.   
In today’s social context, planners worry about how people would react to 
government-ordered quarantine.  Historically, some people who were exposed to 
a disease hid in fear, rather than comply with quarantine orders.  They feared 
being stigmatized or ostracized.3  Others failed to comply because they simply 
were not able.  For example, many people facing quarantine orders need to work 
or care for family.  They also need to move around their local communities. 
These are still likely to be the responses of people today if exposed to a 
                                            
1 Margaret A. Hamburg, M.D., et al., “A Killer Flu?: Scientific Experts Estimate that 
‘Inevitable’ Major Epidemic of New Influenza Virus Strain Could Result in Millions of Deaths if 
Preventive Actions Are Not Taken,” Trust for America’s Health (June 2005): 2. 
2 Joseph Barbera, MD, et al., “Large-Scale Quarantine Following Biological Terrorism in the 
United States,” Scientific Examination, Logistic and Legal Limits, and Possible Consequences, 
no.21, (2001), 2712.  (downloaded from  www.jama.com on October 21, 2005). 
3 Working Group on ‘Governance Dilemmas’ in Bioterrorism Response,  “Leading during 
Bioattacks and Epidemics with the Public’s Trust and Help,” Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: 
Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science 2, no. 1 (2004), 32. 
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biological agent or a contagious disease.  Plans that stress quarantine and other 
restrictive measures must confront the likelihood that community members will 
perceive that they need to violate duly authorized orders that restrain public 
behavior. 
This modern dilemma became apparent when severe acute respiratory 
syndrome (SARS) broke out in Toronto, Canada in 2003.  Approximately 14,000 
individuals were placed in home-quarantine.4  Most people complied with the 
government’s home-quarantine orders.  Many observers, however, doubt that the 
American public, in a similar situation, would respond to government officials’ 
orders to shelter-in-place or home-quarantine.  As of yet, this issue, on a large 
scale, is untested in modern day America. 
The U.S. government’s response to the victims of hurricane “Katrina” 
greatly complicates these perceptions of how the American public and local 
authorities will plan for and act during bio-disaster events.  Failures across all 
levels of government, and the broad dissemination of the visible outcomes of the 
response effort across live television, have diminished the public’s faith in 
government.  The response failures have shaken the confidence of the federal 
government that civilian agencies are able to handle such catastrophes.  Given 
these dilemmas, the American public may be less likely to acquiesce to 
government-ordered quarantine.  The public may be more inclined to exercise 
free will and self-reliance in opposition to imposed orders.   
Unless and until communities and government officials learn to plan 
together effectively and gain trust in each other, individuals will likely not 
appreciate that quarantines and other imposed limits are in their best interest.  
Family and personal needs may become priorities that lead to wholesale 
opposition and resistance to quarantine orders.   
During a crisis, the public will likely look to the government, including law 
enforcement, for guidance and assurance.  If the government is able to earn the 
                                            
4 Maureen A. Cava, et al., “The Experience of Quarantine for Individuals Affected by SARS in 
Toronto,” Public Health Nursing vol. 22, no. 5, (2005), 398. 
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trust of the public during a crisis situation, it will certainly help to ensure 
compliance with requests to quarantine or shelter-in-place.  Trust between 
government and citizens will help eliminate the chaos that could both undermine 
an effective response to a bio-disaster and make the situation even worse.  
Currently, however, governments do not appear to be openly discussing 
bio-disaster plans with the public.  The government should be discussing with the 
public the roles that the public should play during an event, how any interruption 
of services will be addressed, and plans to maintain continuity of life needs in a 
community.  Law enforcement agencies will be at the center of the interaction 
between the government and the public.  Any lack of transparency in planning 
will make the law enforcement task during a potential bio-disaster crucial.  To the 
extent that government officials can earn and maintain the trust of the public 
during a bio-disaster, the chance that a large scale health crisis can be prevented 
will be much greater.  If not, law enforcement will have to be a key component in 
maintaining peace and social order.   
The law enforcement role in quarantine, however, is deeply problematic.  
It calls into question issues related to use of lethal force, the safety of officers, 
and the protection of civil rights that the public desires.  How law enforcement 
agencies prepare to respond during a bio-disaster will determine if and how 
communities can minimize the impact of a bio-disaster on the economy and 
foster the core values of a healthy democratic society.5  Extensive education of 
the public, government and especially law enforcement officials, well before the 
event, may be instrumental in achieving a successful response to a bio-event. 
Surprisingly, although law enforcement officers are first responders and a 
significant part of every community, how they will respond to a pandemic event or 
bio-attack is, as of yet, untested.  Law enforcement officers do not understand 
disease and many of the proposed bio-response plans may face resistance from 
the rank-and-file.  If the Center for Disease Control and Prevention’s (CDC) 
predictions are correct, most workforces can expect to have their staffing 
                                            
5 Working Group, “Leading During Bioattacks,” 25. 
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numbers depleted by up to 30 to 40 percent as a result of illness in a pandemic 
situation.  Those numbers are the anticipated sick people and do not include 
those who remain home due to fear, to care for sick family members, or because 
schools are closed and children need to be cared for.  Yet, without the 
experience of an actual pandemic or bio-attack, any conclusions about how law 
enforcement officials may respond are premature.  Expectations about how 
officers will respond remain limited to information gathered through survey 
studies of intentions and perception, observations of simulated events, and 
simulation studies.6   
What we do know, however, is that a natural pandemic has been looming 
on the horizon for over a year and most state and local governments have not 
engaged the public in planning for a natural disaster, except to tell them to 
stockpile supplies in their homes.  Without question, law enforcement officers as 
a community have not been consulted about their needs and expectations.  Few 
agencies have tried to understand and test the underlying assumption that 
officers will report to work during a bio-disaster.  The way forward in planning for 
a bio-event almost certainly calls for increased governmental efforts to work in 
advance of a crisis with the public and law enforcement to enlist their cooperation 
in the development of plans, designing and agreeing upon responsibilities during 
a disaster, and working to maintain trust throughout a crisis.7 
Social order and trust are interdependent; one cannot exist without the 
other.  The challenge confronting law enforcement agencies involves their dual 
role in planning for a bio-disaster.  They are simultaneously essential to 
guaranteeing social order during an event, and a crucial component of efforts to 
build, plan and sustain trust with the community.  A disaster takes an emotional 
toll on those who live through it, and those who have an active role in responding 
                                            
6 Cleto DiGiovanni, Jr., et al., “Community Reaction to Bioterrorism: Prospective Study of 
Simulated Outbreak,” Emerging Infectious Diseases 9, no. 6 (June 2003), 710-711. 
7 Thomas A. Glass and Monica Schoch-Spana, “Bioterrorism and the People: How to 
Vaccinate a City against Panic,” Confronting Biological Weapons – Clinical Infectious Disease 34, 
(2002), 220-222. 
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to it.  Law enforcement officers will contribute more effectively and recover most 
quickly if they are fully engaged in the planning for a potential bio-disaster.    
B.   RESEARCH QUESTION  
The core question addressed in this thesis is whether law enforcement 
personnel will respond to work during a bio-terrorism attack or a pandemic event.  
If not, what conditions would be needed to enable them to report to work?   If 
officers are willing to report to work, do they understand what their role is in a bio-
incident, both pre-incident and during the event?   
1.   Specific Research Objective 
Government officials are drafting bio-terrorist attack and pandemic 
response plans that include roles for law enforcement.  The goal of the research 
is to determine if government officials and their own leaders have realistic 
expectations of how law enforcement officers will respond. The objective in this 
thesis is to determine if law enforcement officers are willing and able to respond 
to work during a bio-incident.  If not, why?  Additionally, if this research 
determines that officers are willing and able to report to work, are they willing to 
enforce court-ordered quarantine and with what level of force?   This thesis will 
also seek to demonstrate the extent to which basic community-policing 
techniques used by law enforcement in advance of an incident to prepare and 
educate the public may help to minimize chaos, decrease the need for 
government ordered quarantine, and increase aid to the public in healing post-
event.  
2.   Significance of Research 
Many state and local public health departments are confident that law 
enforcement will be willing and able to assist during a pandemic or bio-terrorism 
attack.  Most plans include numerous and potentially unrealistic responsibilities 
for law enforcement, such as enforcement of quarantine orders, security for 
dispensing sites, and continuity of public service. However, police are not 
accustomed to confronting disease-related events, especially without 
prophylactic medicines, such as Cipro for Anthrax.  The workforce of many law 
enforcement agencies will be directly affected in much the same way as other 
6 
businesses – there is the potential for a 30-40 percent reduction in staffing due to 
illness. Bio-incident plans may need to be revised if it is determined that there will 
be significant reduction in law enforcement staffing levels during a bio-incident.   
Law enforcement agencies also need to be able to incorporate the new 
demands on their responsibilities, including the incorporation of new authorities 
and practices arising from health-related events into strategies of policing that 
have served them well.  Police have spent years developing good relationships 
with their respective communities.  By applying basic community-policing 
techniques in advance to educate and prepare the public about the plans and 
what is expected of them, law enforcement may be able to assist the 
government, further enhance the police-community relationship, maximize the 
probability that officers will be both able and willing to respond to health crises, 
and aid the healing process for the entire community in the post-crisis 
environment. 
C.   HYPOTHESIS 
Quarantine represents an extreme measure of legal constraint and force 
against the American public, with criminal sanctions for violations.  As such, law 
enforcement officials will be expected to be involved with the implementation and 
enforcement of quarantine orders.  However, preparedness planning for bio-
incidents has generally not involved law enforcement officials and, as a result, 
may be underestimating the difficulties of and the opposition to quarantine 
enforcement among law enforcement officials themselves. 
This thesis is designed to examine the perceptions, attitudes, and desires 
of local law enforcement officials in regards to preparing to respond to a 
biological event, their expectations about participating in quarantine enforcement, 
ways to overcome problems that might limit an effective public safety response, 
and alternatives to quarantine.  The hypothesis underlying this thesis is that, 
given widespread problems with using local law enforcement officers to enforce 
quarantines, public health and homeland security officials need to design and 
adopt a comprehensive, community-based prevention approach that has as its 
primary goal to minimize the use of quarantine and a dependence on local police 
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to enforce it.  The thesis reviews current misperceptions and assumptions, and 
seeks to identify community-oriented plans and processes that will directly 
involve local law enforcement officials in preparing local residents to respond 
effectively to biological events. 
Throughout this thesis, local law enforcement officials are treated both as 
government representatives who will be expected to help implement quarantines 
and related actions that may deny the freedoms of local residents, and as 
members of the local community with families, relative, and neighbors who need 
to be educated and prepared to prevent and respond to biological events.  This 
dual status of local police during such security episodes calls on emergency 
planners, government officials, and public health and law enforcement leaders to 
work well ahead of events to address officers’ potential concerns and to ensure 
that the local community understands well and is prepared to assist local police 
in their protective duties if an emergency occurs. 
Unfortunately, the literature holds few clues or offers little evidence that 
either emergency planners or law enforcement leaders have begun to pay much 
attention to these potential challenges.  Actually, existing research and policy and 
planning documents point in the opposite direction.  Top-down plans appear to 
understate the role of the public and local communities in preparing effectively 
and constructively for emergency events.  One consequence of this neglect is to 
place local law enforcement officials in a precarious position.  Police are placed 
in the potential role of outside enforcers, rather than participating members of the 
same community.  These top-down expectations and plans undermine the years 
of hard work that police forces have undertaken across the Nation under the 
guise of community-policing to establish and maintain positive, proactive 
relationships with local residents.  They also place officers and their families at 
risk, expecting them to behave during an emergency in a way that, for many, will 
be highly improbable. 
Perhaps most importantly, ineffective planning will increase the likelihood 
that the police will need to use force to implement and maintain quarantines in a 
8 
situation where the public does not understand what is expected of them and will 
challenge even the well-intentioned public safety steps that police will undertake.  
The existing literature indicates that plans are drafted based on worst-case 
scenarios, and on the assumption that the public will panic during an 
emergency.8 If correct, the police will be the frontline authorities to face the 
resulting chaos.  Some researchers, however, challenge these expectations and 
expect more from the public.9  Yet, the ability and likelihood of constructive action 
from the public depends on its knowledge, understanding and preparation.   
 
                                            
8 Glass and Schoch-Spana, “Bioterrorism and the People”, 217-218 
9 Ibid. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The Nation has been on heightened alert for a bioterrorism attack since 
the events of 9/11.  Recently the World Health Organization (WHO) has warned 
of an impending pandemic, primarily responding to the Avian Flu - H5N1 flu 
strain.10  Any plans targeted to bio-events, therefore, should be drafted from an 
“all-hazards” perspective to include a natural pandemic and/or a bio-terrorism 
attack.  The Avian Flu has the potential to kill millions of people and to date there 
is no known vaccine, although there is an anti-viral (Tamiflu) available in very 
limited quantities that offers some level of protection.  The WHO predicts a 25% 
rate of contraction for those exposed to the Avian Flu, while other scientists are 
predicting a 50% contraction rate.11  In the United States, the number of fatalities 
from the Avian Flu is anticipated to be 500,000 or more.12  It is essential that 
states develop plans to prepare for a pandemic and strategies to ensure 
compliance with those plans.  
The number of bio-terrorism attacks worldwide has been relatively small, 
as have the number of related fatalities in each.  Therefore, the vast majority of 
literature on this topic is based on a number of historic epidemics and 
pandemics.  One of the last and most significant pandemics occurred in 1918.13  
Perhaps because of this paucity of real life experiences, according to Glass and 
Schoch-Spana, bio-disaster plans have been and continue to be drafted from the 
position of worst-case scenario with the “belief that panic and civil unrest are 
likely in the aftermath of a bioterrorist attack.”14   
Much of the literature is in agreement that, when government officials draft 
disaster plans, they do so with the underlying assumption that people will panic in 
                                            
10 Margaret A. Hamburg, M.D., et al., “A Killer Flu?: Scientific Experts Estimate that 
‘Inevitable’ Major Epidemic of New Influenza Virus Strain Could Result in Millions of Deaths if 
Preventive Actions Are Not Taken,” Trust for America’s Health (June 2005), 1. 
11 Ibid., 4. 
12 Ibid., 1. 
13 Ibid., 2. 
14 Glass and Schoch-Spana, “Bioterrorism and the People,” 218. 
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disaster situations, and will behave irrationally and be uncooperative.15  Glass 
and Schoch-Spana refute that assumption and repeatedly cite examples of 
disaster incidents where the public demonstrated a collective ability to refrain 
from panicking, while relying on their resiliency, and reversion to customs and 
norms in crisis situations.16  Glass and Schoch-Spana cite the incidents of 9/11, 
Washington Sniper incident and Anthrax attacks as evidence that the public has 
the ability to remain calm and to adapt and cooperate in crisis situations.17  
DiGiovanni, Glass and Schoch-Spana  agree that the public needs to be included 
in the drafting of any disaster plans and that leaders have to actively engage the 
public in the collaborative social responsibility for the outcome of the crisis, by 
supplying them with information on how to prevent the transmission of the 
disease and care for each other and, in the event of a bioterrorism attack, 
imploring them not blame those who resemble the attackers or to stigmatize 
those who become contaminated.18  Schoch-Spana also suggests that planners 
consider using survivors of the disease as a volunteer workforce since they will 
most likely be immunized.19   This proposal is not mentioned by any other author, 
yet it seems an excellent idea. 
Numerous studies show that the media plays an important role in affecting 
a community’s response to crises.  There appears to be a consensus in the 
literature regarding the media and the need to forge good relationships in 
advance, and to deliver timely information during the crisis.20  The results of one 
prospective study of a simulated outbreak found that the media is essential in a 
disaster situation.  Yet, the same study also found that the media also “exhibited 
more fear than any other group except spouses, made high demands for 
vaccine, and had the poorest understanding of medical issues associated with 
                                            
15 Glass and Schoch-Spana, “Bioterrorism and the People, 217. 
16 Ibid., 217, 219. 
17 Ibid., 217. 
18 Ibid., 218-222,  Working Group on ‘Governance Dilemmas’ in Bioterrorism Response,  
“Leading during Bioattacks and Epidemics with the Public’s Trust and Help,” Biosecurity and 
Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science 2, no. 1 (2004), 26. 
19 Hamburg, “A Killer Flu?”, 8. 
20 Glass and Schoch-Spana,”Bioterrorism and the People,” 221.  
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[disease].”21  If this study is demonstrative of the reaction of media in general in a 
natural biological disaster, then the question is what should public officials and 
mainstream media be doing to address the issue of fear in advance of a bio-
disaster – especially since all are in agreement that the media is an integral part 
of communicating messages to the public?  The literature is unclear in this area. 
Protection of citizens’ civil liberties also appears essential in preparing a 
community to respond to a disease-related event.  The Working Group on 
“Governance Dilemmas” determined that government officials should protect civil 
liberties using the least restrictive means to limit contamination and contain the 
infectious agent.22  There seems to be consensus among the writers to some 
degree regarding the draconian concept of quarantine as the least effective 
strategy in an epidemic.  Most articles discuss it in context with civil rights and 
agree it should be a measure of last resort.  The Working Group, referenced 
above, was basically a summit of experts in every field that would be involved in 
a pandemic situation.  They concluded that any restrictions on civil liberties must 
be done in a transparent and equitable way and only when absolutely 
necessary.23  They also cautioned “[l]eaders [to] be well-advised to avoid 
investing scarce public health resources in altering the actions of a few through 
force, at the expense of disregarding the majority of people who are willing to 
cooperate, especially if given compelling reasons to do so.”24   
Law enforcement is of course a crucial element of a safe and orderly 
community, and how it responds to a disease-related crisis will seriously 
influence citizens’ behavior.  Law enforcement will be expected to enforce 
quarantine, if imposed.  There are many questions that are not answered by the 
literature.  For example, in order for quarantine to be effective, will compliance 
have to be voluntary or, if not, how will it be enforced?  What is the level of force 
permitted?  Nothing in the literature considers the various issues related to when 
                                            
21DiGiovanni, Jr., et al., “Community Reaction to Bioterrorism,” 711. 
22 Working Group, “Leading during Bioattacks,” 26. 
23 Ibid., 25, 31. 
24 Ibid., 31. 
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and under what conditions law enforcement officers will be justified in using lethal 
force and, in its absence, how they will be able to enforce quarantine orders.  
What are rules of engagement?   What are the moral ramifications? 
The majority of the literature that discusses quarantine does so from the 
position that a vaccine will be available from the onset of the epidemic or as soon 
as public health officials determine the causative agent.  If that is the basis from 
which plans are drafted, it means the number one priority of public health and 
government officials will be how to quickly dispense the vaccine to the public in 
order to halt the epidemic.   
However, the unanswered question is whether quarantine has any value 
and perhaps is even necessary if vaccines are not available.  That may be the 
case if the Avian Flu strikes United States, as there currently is not a vaccine and 
there may not be one until approximately 6-9 months after the pandemic 
emerges.25   Does this fact change how public health officials will view the issue 
of quarantine?  What will law enforcement be expected to do if vaccines are not 
available.  How will officers respond?  The literature does not address these 
issues. 
Some of the literature addresses stigmatization in connection with 
quarantine.  The Working Group found that “fear of being ostracized [wa]s a 
strong incentive for people to hide disease, possibly injuring themselves or, in the 
case of a contagious illness, those with whom they come in contact.”26   It would 
seem that any attempt to develop quarantine plans would have to take into 
consideration the stigmatism associated with it. The Working Group also 
cautioned officials to be careful not to confuse a lack of willingness to comply 
with health orders, with the inability to comply.27   It is possible that segments of 
the population will feel that they have no choice but to work, to put food on the 
table and to pay rent, which will inevitably result in violations of public health 
                                            
25 Hamburg, “A Killer Flu?”, 7. 
26 Working Group, “Leading during Bioattacks,” 32. 
27 Working Group, “Leading during Bioattacks,” 31 and Glass and Schoch-
Spana,”Bioterrorism and the People,” 221. 
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quarantine orders to shelter-in-place.  The lower socioeconomic segment of 
society may not have sick-leave or savings to draw upon in a bio-
disaster/pandemic. Clearly, there will also be language issues that will further 
exacerbate the issue. This raises another question: what can public officials do in 
the planning stage to create financial incentives or to address continuity of life 
issues so as to encourage the public to comply with public health orders to 
shelter-in-place?   
The Working Group, Glass and Schoch-Spana are in agreement that it is 
imperative to release information about the plan and the type of agent involved 
early to aid in minimizing fear and stigmatization.28  One area where the articles 
disagreed, however, is who should be the spokesperson, the one to release that 
information, during a biological disaster.  Most articles generally advocate for a 
trusted public official as the spokesperson.  However, the results of the 
prospective study of a simulated outbreak were that before the disease was 
identified, all groups wanted information to come from public health officials, 
responders wanted information to come via their respective chain of command, 
and “none of the participants we[re] satisfied to receive information from federal 
authorities only.”29  The same study also revealed that as the situation became 
“more complicated and personally threatening” the participants wanted to hear 
from local officials or federal officials at the site of the outbreak.30  Other 
simulated exercises should be conducted to determine if the results of the 
exercise are an accurate reflection of the public’s response, law enforcement’s 
response, etc. and would it be the same for each part of the United States?  
These results are significant when developing a bio-disaster plan and each 
jurisdiction should carefully consider who to designate as a spokesperson since 
gaining the trust of the public as early as possible is essential to an effective 
plan.  
                                            
28 Working Group, “Leading during Bioattacks,” 30. 
29 DiGiovanni, Jr., et al., “Community Reaction to Bioterrorism,” 710. 
30 Ibid., 711. 
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Across the spectrum of disciplinary perspectives on strategies for a 
biological emergency event, a consensus emerges that the general public needs 
to be included in the development and implementation of any response plan.  
Yet, not much is known about how to use the public as an additional resource.  
The underlying assumption in all of the literature, for example, is that law 
enforcement officers will report to work, be available to respond to calls for 
service, and assist public health through out the bio-incident with security and 
quarantine issues.     
A review of the literature also underscores that researchers disagree as to 
who the spokesperson should be during a biological emergency.  It may be that 
each jurisdiction would have a different response, perhaps reflecting the level of 
trust held in the community between various institutions and groups.  Hamburg 
mentions, for example, that public officials need to be prepared to address the 
economic issues before and after an event, as well as issues surrounding closed 
businesses and schools during a bio-disaster.31  None of the authors, however, 
develops this issue further.  Yet, this would be a monumental problem in a bio-
disaster, especially where a vaccine is not available.  The lack of a vaccine in a 
biological disaster may create a brand new situation with which to involve the 
general public. 
Overall, the literature is weak on identifying public needs and the methods 
government leaders should use to include the public in addressing continuity of 
life issues.  Continuity of life issues are those issues that the public will need to 
have addressed in order to be able to comply with requests of the government to 
quarantine or shelter-in-place (such as food and medical needs) and economic 
concerns (such as paying bills and sick leave from work).  If the government 
were to address these issues in advance and make the public aware of how each 
would be handled, perhaps the public would be likely to trust officials and comply 
with related requests to self quarantine.  A few authors allude to the need, but  
 
                                            
31 Hamburg, “A Killer Flu?”, 3. 
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there is little written on this subject.32  Resources will be scarce and law 
enforcement manpower will be better spent handling public service issues other 
than quarantine.  Therefore, it is essential that plans be developed now that 
include input from the public and law enforcement, roles for the public, crisis 
communication training, and methods to address continuity of life issue – all in an 
effort to minimize the need for large-scale government ordered quarantine.   
There also does not seem to be any information available on law 
enforcement in general and how they will respond in a bio-incident, what their 
expectations will be of government, and how much force to use to enforce 
quarantine.  Law enforcement is likely to have many of the same concerns as the 
public, as disease is not something they are accustomed to dealing with. 
The remainder of the thesis will explore several features of law 
enforcement officers’ willingness and ability to respond to bio-disasters.  After 
describing the methodology used to collect the views of law enforcement officers, 
the following chapter explores the perspectives, concerns, attitudes, and 
suggestions of first responders, the police officers who will be on the front line 
during a biological incident.  The purpose of the chapter will be to highlight the 
expectations of the officers regarding the government and the public, as well as 
the needs of law enforcement in order to be able to respond to work during a 
biological crisis.  This section will also include an interview with a leading 
government official in order to determine the expectations of the official in 
regards to law enforcement personnel during a biological incident and further to 
obtain his reaction to the results of the focus groups.  The following chapter is a 
summation of the research results obtained from the officers in the focus groups 
and the interview of the government official.  The recommendations section is the 
result of the analysis of the research, combined with some suggestions and ideas 
of the officers, and includes a strategic plan intended to address the issue of  
 
                                            
32 Monica Schoch-Spana, “Educating, Informing & Mobilizing the Public,” in Terrorism and 
Public Health: a Balanced Approach to Strengthening Systems and Protecting People.” (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 125. 
16 
family safety and public expectations.  Both of these, if addressed early and 
correctly, will greatly enhance the ability of the officers to respond and their 
























The willingness and ability of law enforcement officers to prepare for and 
to respond appropriately to bio-disasters is difficult to determine in the absence of 
historical experiences.  One way to obtain a better understanding of their 
propensity to act, however, is through in-depth discussions with officers in a safe 
environment where they can express their own views and concerns, and listen 
without worry to the views of similarly situated compatriots.  This thesis used a 
focus group methodology to create such an atmosphere of reflection and group 
exchange. 
The purpose of focus group methodology is to gather information that may 
be “use[d] to generate valid information important to the advancement of 
programs, communities, and organizations.”33  Focus groups allow the 
researcher to listen not only to information conveyed, but also to the emotions, 
attitudes, and thoughts, to better understand the “meaning behind the facts.”34  In 
a situation where it is important to understand in some detail “why” people hold 
certain views, survey methodology is largely ineffective. Surveys determine with 
a good deal of rigor what people think about certain issues, but not why.   
B.   FOCUS GROUP – SAMPLE SIZE 
Groups of 10-13 law enforcement officers were selected to participate in 
four separate focus groups in four separate locations.  The composition of the 
focus groups was designed to represent the average law enforcement first 
responder – the type of officer who during a biological incident would be called to 
the scene, or who would have responsibilities directly related to the event.  
Uniformed patrol officers generally of the rank of sergeant and below were  
 
 
                                            
33 Focus Group Fundamentals,  http://www.extension.iastate.edu/Publications/PM1969B.pdf, 
Last accessed on 01/18/07 
34 Ibid. 
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selected to participate in the four focus groups.  In some departments, a 
lieutenant is the equivalent of a shift sergeant and in those instances he or she 
was also included. 
C. FOCUS GROUP – SCHEDULES AND GEOGRAPHIC LOCATIONS 
Four focus groups were held between August and October 2006 that 
included law enforcement officers from several counties and two states.  This 
variation ensured that officers involved in the discussions had different local 
governments and leaders who may have taken very different approaches to 
preparing them for a biological incident.  The groups included from 8 to 13 
participants and were drawn from among officers in patrol or investigations.  The 
opportunities to conduct the focus groups ranged from off-duty, pre-arranged 
sessions, to educational classroom sessions or on-duty conference room 
sessions.  All group discussions were conducted with the permission of the 
command staff of the involved agency or the professor of the involved university. 
The initial plan was to work with three focus groups reflecting different 
levels of law enforcement authorities.  However, after conducting 3 focus groups 
using law enforcement officers from Maryland, a fourth focus group was 
conducted with officers from Virginia in order to ensure that the initial answers 
received from the Maryland groups were not unique to Maryland.   The 
participants represented various departments neighboring on metropolitan areas.  
The size of these departments ranged from 173 to over 2000 officers.  The 
populations to which the agencies were responsible to provide public safety 
service ranged from 220,000 to over 1 million.  Each of the groups was 
comprised of men and women, African Americans, Hispanics, and Whites.  The 
ratios of gender and ethnic participants were comparable to the corresponding 
ratios on the respective departments.  The overall composition of the focus 
groups was a fair representation of their departments and of those that would be 
expected to respond in and to a biological event.  
In seeking to capture the current knowledge and thoughts of law 
enforcement first responders regarding these issues, focus group participants 
were selected at random and without prior knowledge of the purpose of the 
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discussion.  Each focus group was arranged with the assistance of a member of 
the contributing agency or university in the case of the training session.  
Participants were selected randomly with the criteria being that the candidates 
had to be law enforcement first responders of the rank of sergeant or below.  The 
candidates were not told the exact nature of the focus group pre-meeting or the 
questions that would be asked and did not have time before the session to begin 
to elicit their peers’ opinions on the range of issues covered during the 
discussion.  Participants were given an opportunity before each session to share 
general personal information, relax and meet each other.  The sessions were 
held in informal settings and, once assembled, participants were seated in a 
circular fashion, facing inward, in order to see and speak to each other. 
The participants were assured confidentiality as far as name attribution in 
regards to particular quotes in the thesis, and each member was asked to do the 
same in regards to continued discussion outside of the focus group.  All agreed 
to the terms as set out.35   
D.   LEADERSHIP PERSPECTIVE – A PERSONAL INTERVIEW 
To help put the views of the rank-and-file officers in perspective, a 
personal interview was conducted with a County Executive of a large County in 
the National Capital Region (NCR) within which some of the focus group 
participants lived and worked. 36   This County Executive is the equivalent of a 
mayor of a city.  He is the highest ranking elected official of the jurisdiction.  In 
the event of a county emergency, such as a biological incident, the public is likely 
to look to its highest ranking elected official for information, which in this case is 
the County Executive.  In turn, the County Executive would have certain 
expectations of law enforcement during such a crisis.  During the interview, the 
County Executive was asked a set of questions regarding the state of readiness 
of the County for a biological incident and the expectations of government in  
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regards to law enforcement in such a situation.  After the County Executive 
answered the questions, he was briefed on the cumulative results of the focus 
groups.   
The value of this interview for this study was to determine what a senior, 
publicly-elected official thought about the government’s expectations and 
preparedness for a bio-disaster and his views on what the rank-and-file law 
enforcement officer expressed about the government’s readiness.  The 
combination of documented perspectives provides a rare glimpse into what an 
elected official, and rank-and-file officers, think about each other’s views on 
emergency preparedness.  The gap in their views that emerges is a compelling 
insight into the challenge that faces all emergency planners.  
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IV. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
The focus group discussions contained questions designed to encourage 
initial, non-threatening conversation among the participants.  The questions 
progressed to more intense questions that were meant to stir debate and 
encourage participants to reflect upon their own views.  Each focus group was 
asked the same series of questions, followed in several groups with prompts to 
expand the discussion in order to clarify an answer or to drill deeper for the 
reason for the initial answer.  The answers from each focus group were broken 
down into particular themes and compared and contrasted with each other.  At 
the end of the discussion, each group was given the opportunity to give 
recommendations and suggestions regarding the topics.  These themes 
included, but are not limited to, expectations of the public, responsibilities for 
quarantine, use of force, bio-response plans, and issues that influence an 
officer’s decision to respond to work. 
A.   OFFICERS’ FAMILY PLANS, COMMITMENTS AND OBLIGATIONS 
Initially, the officers were asked about their families and other obligations 
in their lives that might affect their on-the-job performance or their ability to 
respond to work.  The intent was to determine the influence of these factors on 
the everyday job of an officer.  After some discussion regarding the impact of 
family and other obligations on the average work day, the discussion moved on 
to how a biological event might affect the officer’s work, family, colleagues and 
community to determine what impact a crisis would have on the officers’ 
decisions.   
When it came to the impact the family had on an officer’s daily on-the-job 
performance, officers with children had more dramatic responses compared to 
those who did not have children.  Most officers described their attitudes at the 
beginning of their careers as aggressive and somewhat reckless, when 
responding to dangerous situations.  By their own admission, their attitudes 
changed, often after they married, and almost always after they had children.  
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Most officers with children or expecting children have reassessed the risks 
they take that are associated with the job.  They described how children become 
a factor that is now calculated into the mental risk analysis that is done when 
responding to calls for service.  An officer described how having “twin boys 
[made him] more focused on the road.  [He] used to be more reckless and take 
more risks – but thinking about going home to kids and family has made [him] 
more cautious.”  The officers discussed the responsibility they have to their 
children to be there for them as they grow up.  They were also concerned about 
what they might inadvertently bring home to their families. 
Some officers did not give much thought to hazardous materials before 
they became parents.  One officer said that, prior to having children he never 
paid attention to what he stepped in, or what might be on his shoes, referring to 
stepping in blood on a crime scene.   However, at least one officer described 
being concerned about what he brought home on his shoes.  He feared walking 
into the house with his shoes on and walking onto the carpet where his son 
crawled unprotected daily.  The officer described his feelings as follows: 
Even now when I come home, I think what is on my shoes and I 
never considered that before I had kids . . .  Every month or two, I 
have letters in my box about exposure [HIV, Tuberculosis, etc.] and 
I just feel sick . . .  I have to think how many weeks was it, did I take 
my shoes off, I don’t know. . . 
Responsibility for a child was not the only familial responsibility that had a 
dramatic impact on the officers when it came to reducing risky behavior.  The 
officers who did not have children acknowledged concern for their spouse.  They 
indicated that their spouse was in their thoughts daily and that marriage alone 
had curbed some of their early risky behavior.  This impact was especially true in 
families comprised of a husband and wife who are both police officers.   A few 
officers were also married to a nurse or other public service worker.  They 
discussed the difficulties they have when a crisis occurs at work, especially in 
terms of who will stay with the kids and who will go into work.  Several officers in 
this situation explained how the nature of the crisis or event often determines 
which spouse, based on their expertise, would go to work and which one would 
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stay home with the children.  For these two-officer families, a law enforcement 
crisis that would require both to respond would greatly exacerbate their child-care 
situation. 
Yet, even though these officers voiced concern for family members, 
especially children, many did not have a family plan or emergency stockpiles in 
the house.   When asked if they had a family emergency plan or a stockpile of 
food in the event of a natural or man-made catastrophe, the vast majority 
responded that they did not have either.  A very small minority had a full stockpile 
of food and water in the basement, and/or a plan detailing where all of the family 
would meet or a location to call in the event of a catastrophe.  Based on family 
size and the size of the stockpiles, the officers who did have an emergency plan 
determined that they would be able to sustain their family from 3 days to 4 
weeks.  For example, in response to the questions about family planning, one 
officer responded, his: 
…family plan is that there is 4 weeks of food in the basement, 
weapons, duct tape.  Other than that [he] has the truck – [he would] 
call the wife, [have her] put the kids in it and drive to Pennsylvania.  
[He] even went out and bought an ethanol truck in case the Middle 
East oil thing goes crazy.  
Given these concerns about family responsibilities and family protection, 
the focus group discussions turned easily toward what officers would do in case 
of a biological incident.  Several officers responded that in such an event they 
were prepared to take their family somewhere “safe”, primarily to another state.  
In this case, the officers claimed they would seek safety outside of Maryland and 
Virginia, taking their families well into the rural areas of Pennsylvania or West 
Virginia.  Initially, the discussion did not clarify why the officers thought that they 
could take their families somewhere “safe” in response to a biological incident.  
However, later exchanges made clear that most of the officers conceptualize of a 
biological incident in the same way as they do a chemical spill or an anthrax 
release in a building.  These latter, more familiar events are immediately 
containable and, therefore, allow time to leave the scene and subsequently 
return.  Some officers, but not many, understood the implications of a biological 
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incident similar to a pandemic or an undetected biological release and the 
realities that the damage might not be discovered for days – long after people 
had began to show signs of the disease.  The way the officers conceptualize of a 
biological incident may also be why officers who clearly care about their families 
had not made a family plan in order to protect their family during a biological 
attack, because they believe there will be a “safe” place to take them. 
The officers clearly care about their families, spouses and children, and 
they seem to think about them, often explicitly but also implicitly, when making 
decisions involving risk-related behavior.  Hence, it was not surprising that the 
safety of the family was paramount in determining whether to respond to work or 
not during a biological related incident.  
The officers were deeply concerned about family in their normal jobs, 
regardless of any reference to an emergency.  Not surprisingly those concerns 
are multiplied when faced with an emergency. A lack of understanding of what 
the risks are, however, greatly complicated the ability and willingness of officers 
to respond to an event, and strengthened the propensity for them to take care of 
their families first.  In the case of a bio-disaster, this concern for family, in the 
context of alternate information, could easily lead to chaos-creating decisions to 
remain away from work and to seek safety in areas from which they would not be 
allowed to return to their original duty area. 
The officers were then asked if, in addition to their family concerns, how 
they perceived the role of law enforcement in the event of a natural epidemic or 
pandemic or a man-made biological attack.  Reflecting a misunderstanding far 
exceeding instances concerning only their families, these officers said they did 
not understand what would be required of them in general during a biological 
incident.  Most indicated that they would be looking to the leadership of their 
respective departments for guidance.  There were a few SWAT officers who had 
more advance training and they indicated that they would be “going where ever 
the problem is.”   
25 
Most of the focus group participants indicated that they expect to receive 
assignments when an incident occurs, not in advance.  They expected to be 
reactive, not proactive, and many believed they would be in the “hot zone”.   This 
anticipation of facing a contained situation or hot zone reinforced the perception 
that these officers did not understand the different potential scenarios posed by a 
biological event, during which the risk may not be immediately known and would 
be very difficult to contain successfully. 
The officers, however, were not totally uneducated about bio-disasters.  
Most group participants, for example, had some information regarding the 
Strategic Pharmaceutical Stockpile, even if they did not know it by name.  
Officers stated that they had been given some indication by their department that 
they would be involved in conducting security at vaccine clinics.  Two officers 
said that they believed that the majority of law enforcement functions would no 
longer be done in a bio-incident, that security would be their main function: 
. . . basically fall into security related details.  Law enforcement 
[would be] suspended – investigative units would suit up.  They 
won’t be investigating robberies, crashes, whatever . . . 
Clearly, the majority of officers believed that they will be responsible and 
primarily involved in efforts to keep order, quell riots, protect hospitals, and assist 
with egress out of cities.  At least one officer brought up the issue of quarantine, 
in terms of “secur[ing] the area that we think is infected.”  Each group discussed 
the impracticality of evacuating cities and some gave examples, real experiences 
or exercises, of failed attempts to evacuate.  They opined that the nature of traffic 
in the National Capitol Region (NCR), which is the general area in which many of 
these participants worked, is such that evacuation will be chaotic.  They held little 
faith that an evacuation in this area could be effective.  One group discussed 
plans to shut down interstates and funnel people into the fair grounds where 
decontamination would be set up. Those familiar with this evacuation plan 
believe it is doomed to fail because of the everyday chaotic traffic situation in that 
given area. 
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Overall, though, these officers admitted holding a measure of blind faith in 
the preparedness plans.  Several officers said that, although they had never seen 
a plan, nor had they been told for sure that one existed; they felt confident that 
there must be one and they were hopeful that the command staff would be 
sharing it with them soon.  Many indicated they were hopeful that there would be 
an opportunity to be heard regarding the plan, once it was released.  Blind faith, 
coupled with family responsibilities and lack of knowledge about what to do, do 
not make for confident law enforcement officers willing and able to respond to 
bio-disasters and fulfill their critical tasks. 
B.   OFFICERS’ EXPECTATIONS OF THE PUBLIC DURING A 
BIOLOGICAL EVENT 
Officers were asked about how they expected the public to react in a bio-
attack or naturally occurring pandemic situation.  The overall responses were not 
optimistic; the general consensus was that the public would panic and/or over 
react, clogging the 911 system; to some degree officers expect the public to 
become disorderly, potentially rioting.  The response of two of the officers was 
that there is the “[p]otential for mass panic, and [people will] [f]reak out. . . . be 
hysterical.” One officer was adamant that “[t]here will be people breaking into 
your house” – to try to take issued bio-packs.  There was apprehension that 
people will be concerned only about themselves and their families, rather than 
about each other and their neighbors.  One officer said, “[t]he old people with 
asthma – they are done for.” Most of the officers can only foresee chaos, panic 
and a lack of control – what they deem to be an unmanageable situation.  
The collective basis for their opinion seems to be based on what happens 
during minor incidents; they are blown out of proportion by the media and the 
public.  Much of the officers’ expectations that the public would panic was based 
on their individual experiences within their respective agencies during quasi-
critical incidents, such as car accidents, bad storms, and power outages.  
Another officer described how a “really good accident” will overload the 
communications center with voluminous and repeated calls for assistance.  
These incidents generally overwhelm the emergency communications 
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dispatchers and create a backlog of calls to police stations.  The officers used the 
behavior they have witnessed during minor incidents to analogize as to how the 
public will respond in a major incident, such as a bio-attack.  One officer recalled 
what happened in his jurisdiction on September 11, 2001 and expects that the 
same thing will happen, “the [p]hone lines will be jammed up, and you won’t even 
be able to get through, just like 9/11.”   
Several officers stated that they expected that family would be a priority 
with the public, just like it will be for the law enforcement.  Some officers voiced 
concern for those members of the community who do not have family members 
to care for them; one even said, “they (the public) are going to take care of their 
own family first, and if they are busy evacuating their own family then they aren’t 
checking on the 80 year old lady down the street.”  Generally, the group 
participants agreed that they could not condemn the public for doing the same 
thing they would be doing – taking care of their families.  During this part of the 
discussion, the officers recognized that the need to protect and be with family 
members is going to force people to choose between following government 
instructions and their own instincts, which is likely to result in chaos. There was 
some discussion regarding the fact that there will be people who insist on going 
to the schools to get their children, notwithstanding instructions to the contrary.  
There will be members of the public who will want to locate or be with loved ones 
who are being held in quarantine.  Officers appeared to be sympathetic to the 
plight of people during a crisis, while predicting that these same normal human 
responses are going to make it difficult for them to do their job.  
Additionally, as secondary support for their position that the public will 
panic during a crisis, a few officers referred to the public’s response during 
Hurricane Katrina as an example of what to expect in a biological crisis.  One 
officer said that we can expect to see two types of people - those that are scared, 
panicking and don’t know what to do, and those that will take advantage of the 
situation.  Some said that they anticipate that there will be “a run on pharmacies, 
hospitals and stuff like that – people will be self medicating.”   
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Yet, there was one officer who forced the members of his focus group to 
consider the citizens in New Orleans who took it upon themselves to stay and 
help to rescue people and to assist in whatever way possible.  This officer felt 
strongly that there are people who will be assisting police officers during a crisis, 
and he said, “[a]t that point, those people . . . became police officers.”  This same 
officer explained how the officers who stay behind to work during the crisis would 
need to join up with ordinary citizens who elected to stay and help, while other 
officers would leave to take care of their families. He was careful to point out that 
no one should blame an officer for whatever position he took – to protect his 
family, or to come to work.  Others acknowledged that there were some citizens 
who stayed and helped in New Orleans, but they felt that there were too few and 
there was no way to know if that would happen – they could just hope it would.  
Collectively, there did not seem to be much faith in the public to remain calm 
during a biological incident, although clearly at least one officer recognized that 
not everyone in New Orleans panicked during hurricane Katrina. 
The officers collectively believe that the public relies too heavily on them 
for everything, because they are readily available 24/7; officers respond to the 
location of a problem, usually within minutes, and they generally fix the problem, 
if only temporarily.  At the end of each focus group there was a discussion on 
how to prevent such extreme reliance on law enforcement in the future, and 
those recommendations, suggestions and ideas are included in both the 
Summary and Recommendation chapters. 
C. OFFICERS’ EXPECTATIONS OF GOVERNMENT 
The officers were asked to describe either their direct knowledge or 
perception of the preparedness level of their respective police departments, as 
well as the government in general, to respond to a bio-incident.  In response, the 
officers commented on plans, exercises and equipment issues.  
The responses ranged from knowledge that there were plans, without 
knowing what the plans actually entailed, to a majority belief that there were no 
plans at all.  Some departments seem to have better equipped their officers, but 
many officers had little faith in or understanding of how to use their equipment, 
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and there were some who had not been issued some of the specialized 
equipment.  The exception appeared to be the specialized units (SWAT, CDU, 
etc.), most of whom had received the necessary equipment and additional 
training. 
Most of the officers voiced a lack of faith in their respective departments to 
properly prepare them for a bio-incident.  This appeared to be based on a lack of 
knowledge regarding any bio-response plans and to some degree on the inability 
of some departments to properly equip officers with the everyday needs of a 
police officer, such as a police car.   The statements made by the officers in 
response to the questions about the preparedness level of their own department 
ranged from “lack of trust” in the command staff to blind hope that there was a 
great deal of planning that had already done of which they were not aware.  The 
lack of trust expressed by some appeared to be based on the failure of some 
agencies to have what officers perceived as a plan of action for their respective 
agency on September 11th, as it pertained to them.  Officers discussed the 
feeling of vulnerability, of being scared and of feeling ill equipped to handle an 
attack by a plane. 
One officer described how she was working in D.C. on the midnight shift 
and when she came in she expected that there would be a plan, that she would 
do something productive.  However, when she came in she had a uniform, but no 
car.  She was dropped at the Convention Center where she spent 11 hours 
playing cards and once an hour she had to walk the perimeter.  Another officer 
described how he was scheduled to work 11 a.m. – 11 p.m.; officers were 
assigned 5 to a car and told to ride around and be available, to go do field 
interviews, watch movies or play cards.  The officer stated “we didn’t have 
anything to do.”  Another officer described how his command staff put snow 
plows around headquarters.  He used this analogy to support his position that the 
command staff does not know what to do and that they can not be depended on 
in a crisis situation.  These examples served to support their concern that their 
agency did not have a plan and would not know what to do in the event of a bio-
incident. 
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The officers were also given assignments that did not make sense.  In the 
officers’ opinions, what appeared to be seemingly insignificant assignments 
diminished the credibility of the issuing officer and the department.  It is unclear 
whether their supervisors had a basis or not for the assignments given.  
However, these officers certainly wanted to know the basis or significance of an 
assignment or an order.  Law enforcement is a paramilitary institution and, as 
such, officers usually do what they are told or ordered to do.  However, generally 
speaking, if an officer is told the value of the assignment and its significance to 
the mission of the agency, he or she is more likely to do the assignment, do it 
right, and respect the decision of the issuing officer. 
The majority of officers, regardless of their rank or group responded that 
they did not know what their agency was doing to plan for a bio-incident.  Yet, 
these same officers maintained faith that their agency was working on a plan, or 
perhaps had a plan of which they were just not aware.  A few officers were aware 
that their agency was working on a bio-response plan, but they had not seen the 
plan, nor were they privy to the contents.  The following represents the officers’ 
observations:  “we did something in in-service”, “[h]opefully there is some kind of 
plan in place.”  One officer actually thought there was probably a plan of which 
the command staff was aware, but that it hadn’t “trickle[d] down to the people 
who are going to be involved.”  Other officers also expressed concern that 
whatever plans there may be were probably based on the command staff’s 
expectation that the public will comply with orders to evacuate in such a way that 
evacuation will be effective.  The officers were concerned that if there were such 
plans, those plans may have been drafted without realistic expectations of the 
public.    
Clearly, any agency may not want to make their bio-response plans public 
for security reasons.  Terrorists may exploit the weaknesses identified and 
knowing what officials may do could increase the chances of a successful attack.  
Still, in many cases, agencies still simply do not have a plan to share with the 
public or with their own law enforcement officials.  These first responders 
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expressed concern regarding what they perceive as a lack of preparedness on 
the part of their departments, whether valid or not.   
The availability of equipment is also a problem.   Clearly, some 
departments are better equipped than others.  Officers voiced concern about 
both the quality and adequacy of equipment issued.  One officer was very 
concerned because he did not have a mask and others did.  Another officer 
described his own particular handicap, which is clearly not unique.  He said that 
he could not see without his eyeglasses, but when he was issued the mask, the 
expert insisted that he remove his glasses to be fit tested.  The expert also told 
him that the mask will not fit properly with the eyeglasses underneath.  So the 
officer was left with the dilemma of not to wear the mask so that he could see, or 
wear the mask and lose clarity of sight.  He described it as leaving him feeling 
“helpless - with or without it (the mask)”.    
Additionally, the majority of officers who were issued equipment have not 
donned it in a number of years.  They believed their WMD equipment to be in a 
bag or a suitcase in the trunk of their vehicle, but many had not seen it in years.  
Officers from another department described how they were fitted for special suits 
a few years ago, but they were not issued the suits.  The suits are all stored in a 
van and officers did not know if there are enough suits for everyone. It seemed 
that in almost every jurisdiction (represented in the focus groups) members of 
SWAT and CDU were issued their own suits.   
The issue of equipment is difficult because of budgetary considerations.  
However, where suits were issued, officers did not have the same level of 
comfort with their WMD equipment as they do with their crime fighting gear.  
Each group talked about being unsure of how to or in what order to don the suits.  
If agencies make officers practice and train with their crime fighting gear to a high 
level of confidence and competence, why would they not do the same with the 
WMD gear?  Every first responder feels they should be issued adequate 
equipment to protect themselves, even if that means fitting them with a mask.  
Certainly, there is an expense involved, but the sentiment of those who are being 
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passed by for issued and/or appropriate equipment is that the department does 
not value them as individuals.  This can hurt morale, as well as the credibility of 
the department. 
Only a few of the interviewed officers also reported having exercised a 
plan.  There were so few officers that had any idea if a plan existed or not that 
during the discussion it was decided to move on to discuss WMD exercises in 
general.  One officer described an exercise that was done shortly after 9/11 at a 
football field where they created placards and arrows to direct people on how to 
evacuate the site.  He indicated that “it was a giant disaster, cluster, mess.”  He 
went on to say that it was “completely unsuccessful and that officers were not 
prepared”, “some didn’t have masks, or suits or anything.”  Another officer 
described how at his department “they announced a bio-drill, and after the 
exercise, everyone died.”  He was confused as to the point of the drill.  Some 
officers also voiced concern about potential disparity in treatment in the event of 
a biological event.  These officers were of the opinion that the government would 
take care of a “chosen few”, citing the example of how members of Congress got 
the “best meds” during the anthrax attacks.  Those same few officers seem to 
believe that it would be the politicians who would be saved and indicated that 
“they (the government) have a plan for [the chosen few and], they don’t have a 
plan for us.” As the discussion developed, others chimed in that they expect 
there to be a “sacrifice of a small group so that a bigger group could survive.”  
One officer indicated that he thought that the ones who would be sacrificed would 
be public service folks like police, fire and military.     
Although this discussion involved only a few officers, the evidence they 
used to support their position came from a real situation (the Anthrax attacks 
involving the different use of the drugs Cipro or Doxycycline).  One of the officers 
expressed the point this way:  “[w]e need a plan about what to do – [because] if 
we are in disorder and the public [is] looking to us – how much worse will it be if 
we don’t have direction?”   
33 
If law enforcement department leaders were to discuss their plans with the 
first responders in advance of an incident, it might help to curtail some of the 
fear, apprehension and extreme thoughts that some officers have about what to 
expect during a bio-incident.  There did seem to be an underlying fatalistic view 
of such an incident, much of which appeared to be based on a perception of a 
lack of preparation on the part of the agencies and the government in general. 
One officer summed it up as follows: 
I have a feeling that instead of us being beacons of directions, I 
think these plans are going to collapse on themselves and we are 
going to find ourselves being fire bases – officers in the districts in 
with the leadership and when it is necessary to venture out we are 
going to venture out in a big team and do what we have to do and 
come back.  I don’t think we are going to concern ourselves with 
looting and I don’t think we are going to concern ourselves with 
violent crime.  I think we are going to concern ourselves with if 
something serious needs to be done about moving a group of 
people from this place to that place, we are going to send enough 
officers to perform [the task] to get them moving, just basic combat 
patrols.  
The negative perception of officers regarding what will happen in the event 
of a bio-incident is a warning to agency leaders that should be urgently 
addressed.  The best way forward is to have a good plan, practice it with those 
who will be the first responders, learn from the mistakes and exercise it again 
until failure is eliminated.  Agency leaders must then ensure that every first 
responder has adequate, effective and if necessary personalized equipment and 
have them practice using it to a high level of comfort. 
D. OTHER ISSUES AND CONCERNS THAT WOULD INFLUENCE AN 
OFFICER’S DECISION WHETHER TO RESPOND TO WORK DURING 
A BIO-INCIDENT 
During the focus group discussions, several potential issues were 
explored that may influence the officers’ decision whether to respond to work 
during a bio-incident.  Much of the discussion centered on the number-one 
priority, the safety of the family.  Other issues were injected into the discussion to 
determine how they would influence the decision, such as sense of duty, 
availability of a vaccine, and the fatality rate of the biological agent. 
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1. Family Safety 
Throughout the focus groups there was much conversation regarding 
making the family safe that seemed to center around taking them physically to 
another area, a neighboring state for example, that would somehow be 
contaminant-free.  The officers discussed a bio-incident as if it were similar to a 
chemical spill, as if the only possible bio-scenario would involve a contaminated 
area that could be contained – a hot zone with a defined perimeter, localized in a 
one place, with no degree of contagion.  Most officers did not seem comfortable 
conceptualizing of a biological agent injected into society through any means 
other than an explosive and in a situation where symptoms would begin to 
appear days after contamination occurred and make an entire community an 
“unsafe place.”  These officers had difficulty conceptualizing a pandemic event 
altogether.  Two of the focus groups each had an officer who had some 
additional knowledge of biological incidents, either because he was married to a 
nurse or had extensive outside training.  These officers were able to explain to 
the group that a biological incident was different than a chemical attack in that 
potentially it could be days before anyone would be aware that an attack had 
taken place, and it would be very difficult to contain. 
Once officers were aware of the difference, they appeared more 
concerned for their own safety and that of their family.  Every officer had the 
same priority – ensure the safety of their family, whether an adult spouse, a 
child(ren), or elderly parents.  The consensus was that, “I need to make sure they 
are safe.”  “I need to make sure they are out of harms way.”  
In response to the question of whether they would come to work during a 
bio-incident, the response of many was only after the family is safe.  Others were 
not so sure they wanted to risk exposure even then.  One officer responded by 
saying, “I always said that if something horrific happens, I’m not going.  I’m going 
with my family.”  Several officers suggested that the command staff work on a 




respond to work.  On at least two occasions officers suggested that if there was 
some place they could drop their spouses and kids off where they would be safe, 
then they could freely go to work.  
Several officers responded that they would return to work once they had 
ensured that their family was safe, but that in doing so, the officers confessed 
that they would then no longer be able to return to the family out of fear of 
contaminating them.  “Wherever I’m working that is where I’m going to be living.”  
In all four focus groups, there were officers that live one to two counties away 
from the jurisdiction where they work and one of their main concerns was would 
they even be able to get to work.  Once at work, many said they would not be 
willing to go back home and risk exposing the family to whatever contaminants 
they have been exposed to during the course of the working day.     
When told that these situations could last weeks or months, the officers 
then became concerned about when would it be safe to return home: “If I do go 
[to work], when do I get to come home?   When am I considered no longer 
contaminated, no longer a carrier?”  One officer responded that “[i]f my family is 
isolated at home and it is everywhere in the county and I’m running around the 
county, then I’m just going to stay away until a doctor says I’m good to go back.  
I’m not going to take a chance.”   
2. AWOL 
There was significant discussion regarding the issue of others who would 
not come to work in a disaster for a variety of reasons.  Most referred to these 
officers as AWOL (Absent without Leave).  One officer said, “I don’t think every 
single police officer will come to work”, while another stated, “I think anything like 
this, you risk a certain AWOL factor, because germs freak people out.  I think you 
will have a big AWOL rate until people know that their families are taken care of.” 
One of the more recent natural disasters in the National Capital Region 
was hurricane Irene in 2003.  One officer described how during Hurricane Irene, 
he had five relatives who needed help; their houses were underwater and they 
were stranded.  He stated that he called in and said he would not be coming in, 
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because his family needed help.  His concern was that if his jurisdiction had been 
under a state of emergency and his leave had been denied, he would have had 
to make a choice similar to the choice the officers in Louisiana had to make, and 
he said with complete conviction that he would have chosen family, because his 
priorities are “God, family, career.”  
Officers in every focus group discussed how during Hurricane Katrina 
police officers did not report to work.  It was used as an example of what 
happens when the department does not have an effective plan and the families 
have to be made safe. The typical response was that “[s]ome of those officers 
were fired for abandonment and at the same time who could blame them.”  
Overall, officers in the focus groups generally sympathized with the officers in 
Louisiana. 
One officer brought up the point that there may be a distinction “between 
those [officers] who are at home with their families when an incident [occurs] and 
are called [to service] versus those who are already at work” when an incident 
occurs.  The officer’s point was that he believes some level of desertion among 
those who are working at the time of an incident can be expected but, in his 
opinion, more officers are likely not to show at work if they are already safe with 
their families.  One officer brought up a valid question that will remain 
unanswered until a real event: when he asked what will happen when “the first 
man or woman . . .  says ‘I’m not going’ – how many others will see it as 
permission not to go now?”   
3. Sense of Duty  
Most officers said that they would feel compelled to respond to work 
during a bio-incident or other crisis out of a sense of duty to their fellow officers, 
not necessarily to the department, or just to help those in need.  As one officer 
put it, “I’m going to come back because I know [John] is there, I know [Jane] is 
there and for right now those are my brothers, just like in the military, those are 
my brothers and if I know that they are there then I need to be there with them.”  
Some of the supervisors in the focus groups (sergeants) felt an additional duty to 
their “troops.”  
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At least two officers with prior military training equated their commitment to 
the department to the commitment made to the military, and indicated that they 
would come to work, and described it as “[d]uty to each other – everyone is 
coming to work, after the family is taken care of.”   
A female officer assigned to the Capitol in Washington, DC described how 
on one work day, her fiancé was working on the other side of the Capitol when a 
warning was issued regarding a potential air attack – she said that initially she 
was terrified that she was going to die and she wanted to run to him, but then she 
gained control of her thoughts and stayed and did her job.  Other women chided 
her and said if you had kids you would have run in the other direction.  Her 
position was that she would not abandon her station, because she took an oath 
to help people.  She said, “I care about my job and if I had children and I died . . . 
I would want my kids to know that I was doing what I swore to do . . . they would 
respect that in the long run.” 
In each case, the sense of duty appeared to be more toward each other, 
rather than toward the public they serve or the department in general.  It was 
clear from the conversation who within the group had prior military training, and it 
was clear that the paramilitary culture felt a similar duty to fellow officers. 
4. Vaccine Availability 
Initially, in all four focus groups, most officers indicated that they would 
come to work whether or not there was a vaccine available. Almost all those who 
indicated that they were coming to work were already of the impression that there 
would initially not be a vaccine available.  Officers in general acknowledged that 
as a result of the type of job they do every day, there is the potential that they will 
die in the line of duty.  As one officer put it, “I think the assumption is that we will 
not survive it probably because of our exposure – just by doing our jobs. . .”  Of 
course, the caveat that the family had to be safe first was reiterated time and 
time again.  As one officer said, even if “there is no vaccine – I would go and do 
my duty – but I mean my wife and son have to be ok – or be taken care of.”   
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A few could not say for sure if they would come to work.  However, most 
of the officers are under the impression that law enforcement is on the first tier to 
be vaccinated, once a vaccine becomes available, which may not be the case.  
Some could not commit to coming to work if there is no vaccine and/or if the 
fatality rate of the agent was high – these officers felt that they would have to 
make that decision at the time of the incident. 
5. Significant Fatalities  
 When asked about their decisions in the face of significant fatalities, the 
officers echoed similar themes.  When confronted with the worst case scenario, a 
biological agent or pandemic for which there was no vaccine, with a significant 
fatality rate – most officers still believe they will come to work, once the family is 
safe.  Even with a high fatality rate, one officer said, “I think I would still do it.  As 
long as my family is safe, I would do my duty” and others nodded in agreement.   
Although, exactly when “the family is safe” may not be an easy determination.   
In one focus group the initial answer to the question of no vaccine and 
significant mortality rate was answered by concern that “it’s almost like a suicide 
mission”, and if so “then you should go with your family.”   In response to that 
statement, another officer in the same group said, “I don’t think you have an 
option – the department expects us to be here and this is what they want from 
us.”  Eventually, most agreed they would come to work, once the family was safe 
and if they had confidence in the plan, leadership and issued PPE. One officer 
summed it up by saying, “[t]he more confidence that the officers have in [their] 
tactics and equipment . . . the less the fatality rate will be an influencing factor.”  
This was a very significant statement and a common theme throughout all of the 
focus groups.  
6. Conclusion   
As one officer described it, he will have to make the decision on what to 
do with his family at the time, based “on what [he is] told, [his] training and what 
[his] knowledge of the situation is”, before “[he] can start being concerned with 
how [he] is going to help other people”.  According to one officer, officers are 
unsure and uneasy about what is going to happen to their family.  “It is because 
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these top people haven’t trickled information down [and] told [officers] what to 
expect, what their purpose is in [a bio-incident].  If people don’t have a purpose, 
they are not going to come to work . . . If [the department] would address those 
issues now, then maybe [the department] will have a 75% rate of people coming 
in, because [the officers] will know what to expect, what their job is – they will 
understand.”  
A significant number of the officers gave indications that if they knew what 
they were up against, what their responsibilities would be, had faith in their 
Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) to protect them, understood the plan and 
knew that their families were safe, that they would be willing to respond to work, 
regardless of whether or not there was a vaccine and/or the fatality rate of the 
agent.  Those may be difficult criteria to achieve given the current state of plans, 
training and information-sharing with officers, but the need is urgent and deeply 
felt by those who, in a crisis, will have to make a difficult decision.   
E. QUARANTINE AND USE OF FORCE 
Not surprisingly, the discussion evolved to issues surrounding quarantine, 
and questions regarding how officers thought quarantine would work, the role of 
law enforcement as it pertains to quarantine, who would be responsible to 
enforce it and with what level of force.  There was very little consensus among 
the groups or even within groups regarding these issues.  Assuming the focus 
groups were representative of the vast majority of law enforcement, quarantine 
appears to be a subject about which most police officers have little knowledge or 
experience.  
When asked who can order quarantine, the answers ranged from the 
Health Department, to Hazmat, to Fire Rescue, to the Department of the 
Environment, to the military.  One officer responded, well “the department has 
[quarantine] plans; they just haven’t shared them with anyone.”  The consensus 
of three of the groups was that if it got bad enough the National Guard would 
come in and take over quarantine. 
 
40 
1. The Role of Law Enforcement in Quarantine 
The overwhelming majority of officers had no idea how quarantine would 
work or what it would entail in terms of manpower or logistics.  One officer 
indicated that it was “[his] understanding . . . that the fire department w[ould] take 
the lead on quarantine and that we would support them manpower-wise.”  Many 
of the officers agreed that quarantine would be a fire department concern.  This 
opinion seemed to be based on the fact that the fire department handles 
decontamination in chemical situations, therefore they would also handle 
quarantine. 
Most officers appear to be under the impression that quarantine can only 
take place at a designated location and people have to be put into the location.  
One officer described what he thought would happen; he said, there would be a 
location and officers would have to “herd the people in there and maybe not tell 
them they are being quarantined.”  One officer stated that he didn’t think it was 
realistic to believe that we were going to be able to get people to go to a location 
to be quarantined – in his opinion “people won’t open the door, they will hide from 
you, you won’t be able to find everybody you need to find.”  The officers equated 
it to the response officers get when they attempt to evacuate a building when 
there is a fire next door or a flood - people just elect to ignore or disregard the 
requests or instructions of the police and act independently. 
Most of the discussion went from one extreme to another.  There was the 
concern that things would become so chaotic that there would be lawlessness.  
One officer suggested, “I think if the situation is big enough . . . I think the police 
department will stop caring about looting and violent crime – I think the police 
department will be specifically tasked with quarantining and cordoning off certain 
zones and areas.”   While on the other hand, there were those officers who 
anticipated a civil response and thought people should be treated as officers 
would want to be treated, “[y]ou . . .  almost have to tell the people what is going 
on.”  Another officer said, “[y]ou would hope that everyone is sane enough to just 
say I need to be quarantined.”   
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2. Amount of Force to be Used to Enforce Quarantine 
The discussion about whether to use deadly force to enforce quarantine 
resulted in a very emotionally charged conversation in each focus group.  In one 
group, several officers said they would use deadly force to enforce quarantine, 
while another officer in the same group said, “no force . . . because the people 
are not symptomatic and [therefore] you don’t have [a belief that] they are a 
danger to anybody if they get out.”   
Those advocating the use of deadly force justified it on the belief that if the 
contaminated escapee came in contact with people he/she could cause the 
death of the officer or others.  Other officers argued that they would use force to 
detain those violating quarantine orders.. . . if “these people are quarantined and 
[there is] the possibility of them having it and the possibility of these people 
spreading it to someone and they can spread it further, then I [would use] deadly 
force.”  Another officer said, “I’m saying that if you got a situation where we’re 
being infected and that infection can spread to a place that we know is okay then 
no, I don’t think that person should be let out of that area to go to this area.  If 
that person . . . is going to come out of there and we tell them to stay and they 
come out, yeah, I say [use] deadly force.”   
There seemed to be strong emotional conviction on the part of some of 
the officers to protect the rest of society from those who could potentially spread 
the disease.  One officer couched his feelings in the follow terms: “[w]hatever 
force that will keep them on the other side of the line, I’m doing it.  If they arrest 
me and take me, so be it – I died doing what I was supposed to do to protect the 
rest.”  Another indicated that his goal would be “to protect the public.”  He said, “if 
these people (quarantined) were to infect other people absolutely and they get 
away and what they will be giving them is deadly – then deadly force is probably 
necessary to prevent it from spreading.” 
The concern of some of the officers appeared to be based on the fear that 
if even one person were permitted to break quarantine, then everybody would do 
it.  Officers compared the situation to when they put up cones to block a road and 
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one person circumvents the cones, then everyone tries to do it.  Since none of 
the officers in any of the focus groups had any experience with quarantine, they 
made attempts to understand and perhaps rationalize the basis for the need to 
use deadly force by using examples and comparisons to things with which they 
were more familiar.  Some talked about the similarity to a fleeing felon who may 
kill or cause serious injury or death to an officer or another person: “[t]hink of the 
guy that robs a bank and is running down the street with a gun, you shoot him in 
the back because he won’t stop, because he can shoot everyone in his path.  
You can’t let him leave.”  Another officer described that it was like having an 
infection in a body limb that will eventually kill the body unless it is removed – 
either you remove it and save the rest of the body or you allow it to live and it kills 
the entire body. 
One particular issue spurred contentious debate, when someone asked, “if 
someone violates the airspace in D.C. and flies toward the White House, “then 
they are getting shot down – isn’t it the same thing?  So what’s the authority to 
shoot them down?”  An officer who opposed the use of deadly force responded 
with “[w]ell in quarantine, it is may be exposed.”  The response to that statement 
was “[w]ell I would say the threat is still there.  The guy flying into airspace may 
be lost, but he is flying into airspace.” 
Some officers who could not advocate the use of deadly force admitted 
that they were willing to use physical force, which in turn spurred a discussion 
about what physical force is enough, when do you stop and when does physical 
force turn to deadly force.  As one officer said, “I think you would have to 
physically grab them and detain them.  I wouldn’t start shooting them, but I would 
physically not let them leave.”  In response to that statement, another member of 
the group asked, “At what level of resistance do you stop?” 
Even among groups in which there was a significant moral debate about 
whose position was correct (to use deadly force or not) – some acknowledged 
and accepted the decision of others to use deadly force, but confessed that they 
were not sure what they would do in that same situation.  One officer who 
43 
appeared to be agonizing over the issue, finally said, “I would think that most 
people, if you explain it to the people you are quarantining, that most people are 
reasonable . . . . at least for a little bit of time – that they will comply with you – 
not if you’re quarantining them for days or extended periods of time and you don’t 
know what it (the agent) is then you’re going to have problems.”  Another officer 
agreed, with the caveat that “[t]he longer the quarantine goes on the more 
problems you’re going to have.” 
One group in particular emphasized the need to talk to the community and 
the officers in advance of a quarantine situation.  The officers were very 
concerned that the diametrically opposed opinions at the table would come into 
play during a real bio-event, and wanted these issues resolved pre-event.  They 
also advocated for the education of the public about quarantine in an effort to 
compel maximum compliance with quarantine orders, and to avoid “use of force” 
situations like those discussed. 
Clearly, participants in these focus groups need much more information 
and guidance about what quarantine is, who can authorize it, who can enforce it 
and with what level of force.  The moral dilemmas underlying these questions 
were also quite apparent and generated more interpersonal heat the deadlier the 
biological agent under discussion was.  At the conclusion of each focus group the 
officers were informed that in Maryland violation of a quarantine order is a 
misdemeanor charge.  In response, some became defensive, asking why officers 
would have to use manpower to enforce a misdemeanor.  Why, they asked and 
would it still be a misdemeanor to violate the order if the agent were potentially 
deadly.  Some responded that if it was only a misdemeanor charge, then they 
would not enforce the quarantine order.  Their confusion and even rejection of 
potential obligations of their duties underscored why it is imperative to engage 
officers far ahead of actual events.   
3. Sources of Information 
Officers were asked who they would expect to provide them with 
authoritative information, during a bio-incident, about their role as law 
enforcement.  A few wanted to hear information and instruction from their first 
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line supervisor or direct supervisor and a few just wanted to hear from someone 
above their own rank.  This may have been as a result of comfort and familiarity 
with a particular supervisor, or in order to eliminate liability by receiving 
instructions from a higher ranking officer. 
However, the majority wanted clear direction from the “top”, the “command 
staff.”   Most of the officers indicated that they would be looking for guidance and 
leadership via the chain-of-command, from someone who knew something about 
the subject matter.  It was a common theme among the officers – they wanted to 
hear from someone they trusted and considered a subject matter expert.  They 
would be seeking “guidance from a trusted source on how to protect [themselves] 
and [their] troops”. . . “[information] ha[d] to come from someone on the 
department who [they] trust[ed].”  Unfortunately, there were few who could 
actually identify a trusted subject matter expert on their department.   
A few officers indicated that they expect those who will be giving the 
orders to be out front wearing the equipment, demonstrating that the equipment 
is safe and/or that the environment is safe – in other words, leading by example.  
One officer said, “in a situation like that I better see whoever is leading me . . . up 
there leading me.”   It is understandable that officers would want to see 
representatives of the command staff working among the rank and file, donning 
similar PPE and facing similar exposure – this would reassure them that they are 
receiving appropriate information and being led by those who care about the 
officers’ safety. However, at least one officer cited 9/11 as a reason why even a 
trusted source may not have the right information – since during 9/11 everyone 
was told the air was safe and now a lot of people are sick.    
Sources of desired information from outside their own agencies included 
the CDC, Health Department, the mayor, governor and other leading public 
figures.  The officers would rely most, they said, on the Fire Department and/or 
the HAZMAT team.  This seems to be a direct result of the working relationships 
between these agencies and the significant level of mutual trust.  Many law 
enforcement agencies defer to the Fire Department and HAZMAT teams when 
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dealing with hazardous material, chemical spills, etc.  Both agencies work on all 
types of scenes together and the majority of fire and police agencies have a 
mutual respect for each other.  As one officer said, “You’ll get the real truth from 
the fire department – they would be straight forward.” 
The officers seem inclined to defer to fire officials as the knowledgeable 
and respected source for disease information and quarantine because they trust 
them and know that when it comes to chemical spills and attacks, HAZMAT has 
been trained on containment and decontamination and that is the context in 
which police seem to think of a bio-event.  Officers understandably want to hear 
from the CDC and State and Local Public Health officials regarding the biological 
agent, vaccines, and incubation periods, since they are established subject 
matter experts.  It seems that generally officers are unaware of a biological 
subject matter expert on their respective department, if indeed there even is one.  
The lack of plans, or conveyed information regarding plans has resulted in a 
perception by officers that there is no reliable source of information within their 
own department.  This may account for the reliance or appeal to government 
authority, such as a mayor or governor for reliable information during a bio-crisis.   
4. Officers’ Suggestions of What Should Be Done 
At the end of each focus group, the officers had the opportunity to 
recommend or suggest what could or should be done in advance of a bio-event 
to address some of the issues they had raised during the discussion period.  
There was consensus among all of the groups regarding several suggestions 
posed by the officers.  Every group emphasized that they wanted to know what 
their agency’s plan was in the event of a biological incident, bio-terrorism attack 
or a pandemic.  Most officers emphatically connected to one or more of the 
following expressions of their concerns: 
I want to know the plan.  I want to know the plan. [repeated with 
emphasis] 
They need to tell us what the plan is.    
We want to see the plan; it needs to trickle down to patrol.  
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They should tell us what the plan is so we can share it with the 
community.  
I just think [the commanders] need to get the plan out to the 
officers, it is not like we are just sitting around waiting for . . . a bio-
hazard and then we break [open an] envelop that says Bio-hazard 
and it says ok, step 1 do this. . .  We should know ahead of time . . . 
we need to know what to do ahead of time.  
There is no way we can have a plan for every scenario, we 
understand that, but just give us an idea.  
The officers were also quite adamant about the need for realistic, actual 
hands-on training (not table tops), which would require using equipment and the 
issued PPE.  Some officers had been issued all of the necessary WMD 
equipment, some had only been issued a portion (i.e., suit, but no mask), and 
others had not received any.  Those that had none indicated that they were told it 
would be brought to a central location in the event that there was an incident.   
Whatever the situation, the officers indicated that they wanted the 
opportunity to put on the PPE, more than once.  It seems that those who were 
issued equipment had been given the opportunity to don it once upon initial 
issuance and in many cases that was at least three years ago.  The officers 
discussed the disparity between the training they get with their handgun and that 
they get with the use of their PPE – they are required to shoot (qualify) at the 
range several times a year to demonstrate proficiency with their issued weapon.  
This creates muscle memory and a conditioned response which the officers rely 
on in high stress situations to ensure that they will be able to do what is required 
without having to rely on memory. 
One officer suggested that the command staff conduct “an unannounced 
exercise” in which people would be “held accountable”.  He went on to describe 
how it should be a spontaneous exercise, where officers are told to go to their 
car, get their gear, and don it.  Then the executive staff would actually see who is 
prepared and who is not.  A few of the officers speculated that some officers 
would not even be able to locate their PPE and even if they did, they would not 
remember how to put it on or under what conditions it could be used to protect 
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them.  The officers expect that many would fail such an exercise because it had 
been so long since they had been issued the equipment that they had forgotten 
where it was, how to don it and what it could protect them from. 
Several officers discussed how important it was for law enforcement to 
have confidence in their issued equipment and in the associated tactics – and 
indicated that this would only happen if officers were permitted, or forced, to wear 
the gear in realistic situations, repeatedly. On two occasions, officers brought up 
“active shooter training” which was developed after the Columbine High School 
shootings – post-Columbine officers were trained to respond differently in active 
shooting situations.  If it was an active shooting situation, it was no longer 
acceptable to set up a perimeter around a building and wait for specialized units 
to respond before making entry.  Instead, the officers were trained that those who 
were first on the scene of an active shooting had to assault the building in a team 
formation with the goal of saving lives.  They practiced the tactics repeatedly 
inside of the schools and continue to do so annually – this is why they feel 
comfortable and confident using this tactic. The officers indicated that they 
wanted to have that same level of confidence in how to use and when to wear 
their WMD PPE. 
The officers were asked about what could and should be done to improve 
the expectations of the public in regards to law enforcement.  Several officers 
suggested that we “[t]ell them the truth.”  “Tell them there is a plan and what they 
are going to be doing.” They also suggested that we “[t]ell them what we need to 
make our jobs easier.” Some of the officers expressed more frustration than 
others regarding a lack of information about a plan.  As one officer said, “[t]he 
public is going to expect guidance from us but . . .in order to give that guidance to 
the public, we are going to need that guidance from above and I think more than 
one person mentioned it, we are not getting it.” 
Throughout the focus group discussions, it was clear that officers 
understood that the government could not release all of the details of a response 
plan (where and when), out of fear that the information might fall into the hands 
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of terrorists or others who may wish to disrupt or sabotage the police response to 
an incident.   However, with that knowledge, the officers still felt strongly “that 
[they] have to instill confidence in the public so that they [will] know if something 
happens that they can have confidence that [the police] can handle it.”  As one 
officer said, “[w]e need to share our plan with the public, see what their response 
is to it – they are more apt to follow instructions if they know the plan, [and] what 
and why they are supposed to be doing something.  According to one officer, 
“[t]he community expects us to keep them informed, have answers, keep them 
safe, and give them directions, and to stop whatever it is.  Stop the bad thing 
from happening.  Short of the National Guard walking in and taking the streets 
we are IT, we’re their safety net.”  
A number of officers suggested that the government consider holding a 
“Question & Answer” forum with the community, just like “we are doing here 
today [referring to the focus group]. [Ask them] what do you think about this 
question – would you obey [quarantine] or not . . .”   Another officer suggested 
that it may be useful to meet with the community to talk to them about 
quarantine, ask them if they would cooperate or not.  Yet, another thought the 
government should just “[g]ive them information . . . specifically . . . about being 
quarantined.”   
The officers suggested ways to drive the information home to the 
community members.  One suggested using schools and children, “Who is the 
most easily influenced?  Who knows the fire drills?  Repetition in schools and 
[the kids] can help to bring the information [home] to the parents.” Another 
suggested that departments have officers hand out a bio-hazard pamphlet to 
every victim/complainant they encounter during each tour of duty. 
The officers made it very clear – they want to know if their agency has a 
plan for responding to a biological incident or attack, or not.  If there is a plan, the 
officers want their command staff to share the plans so that they can understand 
their assignment, know their responsibilities, and be mentally prepared to 
respond.   The officers expect the public to turn to them for all the answers during 
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a crisis – they want the public to know the plan, to the degree that it affects them 
and to have more realistic expectations of law enforcement.  Lastly, the officers 
know that in a crisis situation they are going to rely on conditioning and training, 
and they do not feel confident regarding how or when to use their WMD PPE, or 
how to respond in a bio-incident. 
F. HOW ELECTED OFFICIALS VIEW OFFICERS’ CONCERNS 
Clearly, law enforcement officers have strong opinions and 
comprehensive perspectives on how well they are prepared for a biological 
event, and what needs to be done to improve their readiness.  Given the clear 
lack of communication generally between these officers and elected officials who 
may have drafted strategies and plans for an emergency response, it is obviously 
important and fair to include the views of senior local officials about the degree of 
preparedness in their jurisdictions. 
As mentioned previously, the County Executive of one of the jurisdictions 
represented in the focus groups was interviewed.  He was asked a series of 
questions about emergency preparedness levels in the county and expectations 
of how law enforcement should behave during a crisis.  After the interview, he 
was informed of the results of the focus group discussions and discussed the 
implications.  The following discussion provides a synopsis of the interview. 
1. Interview with County Executive  
The County Executive who was interviewed had 12 years of experience as 
an elected official of a large county in the National Capital Region, and he will 
hereinafter be referred to as Mr. Thomas (not his actual name).  He had three 
successful terms as a County Executive, and had recently decided not to run for 
re-election. Therefore, it was anticipated that he would be forthright and honest in 
his responses and draw upon 12 years of experience and institutional knowledge 
as a county executive officer and now free of concern that he might be pressured 
to implement, support, or initiate any of his ideas or suggestions.   
Initially, Mr. Thomas was asked what he thought the level of risk was to 
Montgomery County in terms of a bio-incident.  In Mr. Thomas’ opinion, the 
County is at high risk of an attack because of where it is situated within the 
50 
National Capital Region, its proximity to Arlington County (Pentagon) and 
Washington, D.C., as well as the fact that the county is home to a number of 
significant sites – potential terrorist targets.   
When he was asked about the number of tabletop or actual training 
exercises that the County had participated in regarding terrorist attacks or a 
pandemic event, his initial response was that he was unsure.  He was under the 
impression that there had likely been some such exercises in the NCR and, if so, 
the County would most likely have participated in them.  He stated that he was 
aware of at least a few table-top exercises that had been completed within the 
County and at least one other exercise that had required the participants to don 
Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) and to conduct decontamination drills.     
Mr. Thomas went on to describe some of his concerns after the last 
exercise (PPE and decon) that he attended.  According to Mr. Thomas, the 
volunteer firefighters were upset because they did not have the protective suits 
that the paid firefighters had been issued, even though their assignment would 
not have required them to wear the same PPE.  According to Mr. Thomas, 
“during the exercise, it struck [him] that the fire chiefs were afraid; they wanted 
the best of the best.”  At which point, he realized that if the leadership or 
commanders are nervous and showing fear, it will negatively impact those they 
are leading.  
At one point during the interview, Mr. Thomas indicated that he had 
already come to the conclusion that “[we] can’t take it for granted that [law 
enforcement] will be there.  [We] have to do things to make [the officers] feel safe 
so they will go out and make everyone else safe.”   According to Mr. Thomas, he 
came to this conclusion while attending a police roll-call during the Sniper 
Shootings in October 2002.  He recalled a time when just prior to entering a roll-
call, he received a phone call informing him that the witness in the Fairfax, 
Virginia shooting had lied and therefore what many had considered the only real 
lead in the case had been found to have been fabricated.  Mr. Thomas said that 
after the phone call he entered the roll-call room and was looking at the officers 
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as he gave them the bad news from Fairfax County about the witness.  He said 
that he recalled seeing real “fear in their eyes”.  That is when, as he put it, he 
realized that “they were as scared as everyone else.” 
When Mr. Thomas was asked about how he expected the public to 
respond in a bio-incident, he answered by recalling how the public had 
responded during the Anthrax attacks that took place in the Fall of 2002 in the 
Washington area (Senate Office building and Post Office) and in Florida.   “We 
[received] hundreds of calls during the Anthrax scare.  People called about 
everything.”  The public is going to expect Public Health to tell them what to do, 
where to go, and the public will only listen if they have confidence in the source 
of the information.  The information would have to be accurate and weighed 
against the need to know and the fear it might create in the public.  He recalled 
how during the Anthrax scare the government had put out some incorrect 
information which hurt the credibility of public officials.  Hence, “we have to be 
clear about the information we disseminate, give it out in a timely fashion, reach 
out to the public and help them to help themselves and their neighbors, and force 
them to think about someone besides themselves. 
When asked what he thought the public would expect from law 
enforcement, he responded that the public would expect the police to be there, 
be calm and reassuring, have answers, tell them where to go and what to do, 
and to know what they are talking about.  Mr. Thomas is of the opinion that of the 
entire population in County (just under 1 million), maybe 10% is actually prepared 
for a bio-incident.  As he indicated, many were prepared after the Anthrax 
attacks, with water and food supplies, medical supplies, and a family plan.  
However, people get into a comfort zone and do not see the need to continue to 
store food, water, or medicine. 
The County made efforts to educate the public regarding emergency plans 
before Y2K and after 9/11 and has held several town hall meetings where 
citizens were invited to come ask questions and receive information regarding 
emergency preparedness and family plans.   Mr. Thomas indicated that there 
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were over 500 people at the first town hall meeting and thereafter the attendance 
began to decrease significantly.  Then at what eventually was the last town hall 
meeting, the BBC (British television) was in attendance to do a media piece and 
hardly anyone came.  The auditorium was virtually empty and the county had to 
request that county employees come to fill the seats so there would be people 
present in the audience for the media.  
When asked if the County had considered how it would address continuity 
of life issues in a protracted biological incident, Mr. Thomas responded that the 
county had discussed prioritizing government services and creating contingency 
of operation plans (COOPs) for some agencies, but not much beyond that had 
been done.  He confirmed that there are segments of the county government that 
are working to finalize continuity of operations plans (COOPs).    
Mr. Thomas was asked what would happen to officers who agreed to 
come to work during a bio-incident who later became sick.  Clearly, if the 
sickness could be directly related to an assignment or a call for service then the 
officer would be covered under Workman’s Compensation, and if he or she died 
it would be treated as a “line of duty” death.”  Mr. Thomas responded that he 
assumed it would, but agreed it would need to be addressed before the incident.  
He based his answer on the need to maintain a workforce that would be working 
long hours and therefore the county would have to assume if an officer came 
down with the disease that it was work-related.  
When it came to the issue of quarantine, Mr. Thomas anticipates the need 
for quarantine; however, he acknowledged that quarantining an entire 
neighborhood would be very difficult.  He did not foresee police arresting people 
and bringing them to jail, instead he thought they would be telling people to go 
home and stay there.  He believes that there may be a need to prohibit people 
from assembling in large groups to keep the disease from spreading, similar to 
what was done in 1918 during the Spanish Flu.  Mr. Thomas stated that the 
public in the NCR has historically had difficulty existing after a few days during 
power outages, snow storms, etc.  As he said, “the longer it goes on, the more 
53 
problems we should expect.”  He recalled how during the Sniper shootings 
toward the end the press and the public were beginning to lose patience and in 
his opinion if the police had not apprehended the suspects when they did, both 
the media and the community would likely have turned on law enforcement.  
After the initial interview was over, Mr. Thomas was informed of the results 
of the four focus groups.  The author of this thesis told him that the overall 
consensus of the police officers was that they would respond to work, but only 
after their families were safe.  He was also told that the officers had expressed 
concern about returning home to their families out of fear that the officer might 
inadvertently contaminate a family member, after an unknown exposure, when 
there was no vaccine.  Mr. Thomas agreed that the County should work to set up 
a Family Support Unit, similar to the one used by the Fire Department for the 
USAR Team and that the government should contract for hotels to house those 
officers who elect not to return home.  He was also amenable to holding open 
forums, or town hall meetings for the officers and the public to discuss the issue 
of a pandemic or a biological attack. Mr. Thomas felt that the open forums could 
be used to introduce the communities to the public health officials so that they 




                                            
37 Throughout the interview, Mr. Thomas appeared to be honest and forthright in his 
responses; it appears that he clearly cares about the people of the county he served and because 
of his experience with the Sniper Shootings, he may have more insight into the needs of the 
officers and a better understanding of how the public will respond in a crisis situation than any 
other public official.  He was amenable to a Family Support Unit, similar to that of the Fire 
Department, which would care for the law enforcement families.  He is also amenable to allowing 
officers to stay off-site, at the expense of the County, during a bio-incident while there is concern 


























The following is a summary of the results of the main issues raised during 
the focus groups.  The officers seemed grateful for the opportunity to be heard on 
these issues and their thoughts and concerns should be considered by 
government officials when drafting bio-response plans.  The following discussion 
is simply separated into the primary issues addressed. 
A.   FAMILY PLAN 
Clearly, the officers’ primary concern is and will be the safety of their 
families.  Although the study hypothesis expresses doubts that officers will 
respond to work during a biological crisis, the focus group results suggest 
otherwise.  The officers clearly indicated that they would come to work during a 
biological incident, but only if they could be assured that their families were safe.  
This means that if the family could not be removed to a safe location, then the 
officer would need assurance that the family was safe at home and that their 
needs were being met.  It was clear throughout the discussions that if this issue 
is not remedied the government will not be able to rely on law enforcement to 
respond to work during a bio-incident, regardless of the cause (man-made or 
natural).  Some of the officers suggested a compound of some sort where all of 
their family members could be taken and cared for.  On its face this appears to 
be an ideal answer.  However, there are problems inherent in the idea of a 
compound that may cause more issues for government than it remedies.   
First, there is the feasibility of locating and securing a site that is capable 
of housing all of the family members of each officer, the second issue is defining 
the parameters by which to identify the  actual family members of each officer 
(i.e., grown children, dependant parents, divorced spouses, or common law 
spouses), and lastly, government should expect essential employees from other 
departments within government to demand similar assurance that their family 
members be cared for so that they can come to work.  
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Therefore, a “Family Compound” may not be a realistic alternative, for the 
above reasons.  However, a “Family Support Unit” (FSU) may be a more viable 
option.  Some Fire Departments have a family support unit – a unit that cares for 
the families of firefighters who are deployed to other areas to assist with rescues 
or fires, such as the USAR team.  The families of law enforcement would then be 
able to stay secure in their homes, basically sheltering-in-place, without risk of 
potential exposure.  The FSU could check on them daily to ensure that they have 
the food, medicine and necessities they need, and if need be arrange for 
transportation to a medical facility.  
However, several officers indicated that they were concerned about 
returning home after a day’s work, if the bio-agent involved were contagious and 
there were no vaccine to protect them or their families.  The officers indicated 
that they are willing to come to work and to risk personal exposure, out of a 
sense of duty to their fellow officers.  However, they did not want to potentially 
risk exposing their family to the biological agent inadvertently.  A few officers 
suggested that the agency consider how to house and care for the officers who 
came to work, so that they would not have to return home until there were a 
vaccine or until medical officials deemed it safe to return home.   
B. PUBLIC EXPECTATIONS 
The officers indicated that they would like the public to have more realistic 
expectations of them during a biological crisis and in turn the officers would like 
to feel confident that they would be able to meet the realistic expectations of the 
public.  To accomplish this, two issues need to be addressed pre-event.   
First, the general public, media, and elected officials all need to be 
educated regarding what to expect of government and law enforcement during a 
bio-incident, and communities need to learn how to become more self-reliant.  
Secondly, the officers want to be confident and capable of carrying out 
assignments and responsibilities related to a bio-event, to know the rules and 
parameters for operating in bio-environment, to have confidence that their 
equipment will protect them, and to feel that their training has prepared them for 
a bio-event.  
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In order for the public to have more realistic expectations of law 
enforcement and to be better prepared to care for themselves and their 
neighbors in advance of an event, officers believe the public needs to be 
educated and given the opportunity to ask questions, pre-event.  The public 
should be educated regarding the limitations and responsibilities that law 
enforcement will be grappling with during a biological incident, such as reduced 
staffing, quarantine, shelter-in-place, PPE limitations, emergency preparedness, 
etc.  The second issue that needs to be addressed pre-event involves the bio-
response plans. 
C. BIOLOGICAL RESPONSE PLANS 
The officers have indicated that they believe that their respective agencies 
have plans on how to respond to a biological event and they want those plans 
shared with them immediately. The officers repeatedly insisted that there must be 
plans even if they were not aware of them – they held out hope that their 
department was prepared to address a biological incident, but perhaps had 
forgotten to share the plans with the first responders.   
Ideally, every agency should have a plan for how to respond to a 
biological attack or incident.  Those plans need to be shared with the officers, 
especially the first responders who will be on the ground responding to calls and, 
interacting with people who may be carriers of the disease.  The officers 
understand that the plans may have to be sanitized to some degree before they 
can be shared with the public.  However, once properly sanitized the plans need 
to be shared with those responsible for carrying them out, and then with the 
community.  
The focus group discussions clearly showed that many of the officers 
conceive of a biological incident the same way they do a Hazmat incident or a 
chemical attack.  Some biological incidents will require a response similar to a 
chemical response, especially if the bio-agent is not contagious and the 
dissemination location is immediately known or contained, such as an anthrax 
release at the post office.  Yet, other biological events will be different.  Officers 
had a difficult time envisioning a biological attack involving a contagious disease 
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where the release may take place weeks before anyone is aware of it.  In this 
type of situation the biological agent would already be in and among the 
population, and people would be sick, so there would not necessarily be a hot 
zone to encircle, nor would decontamination measures be the immediate 
response.  The officers had similar difficulty with the concept of a pandemic, 
which might only be discovered once someone who had the disease was already 
in and among the public and had contaminated others.  It was clear that they had 
a much better understanding of Hazmat incidents and chemical spills. 
D. EXERCISES, TRAINING, AND PPE 
The officers also expressed a desire to exercise and train using their 
WMD PPE in order to become confident in their equipment and in their ability to 
respond properly.  Several of the officers made statements that suggest that only 
a few of the officers knew how to properly don their PPE, under what 
circumstances they should wear it, or what it will protect them from.  Some 
alleged that they had received their PPE shortly after 9/11 and had not put it on 
since.  There were a small number of individuals who indicated that either they 
had, or they knew others who had been involved in at least one actual training 
exercise.  In the officers’ opinion, those who had been fortunate enough to have 
attended a training exercise had gained beneficial experience, even when the 
exercise failed.  However, according to the focus group attendees, the actual 
number of first responders who had been permitted to attend a training exercise 
was very low. 
E. QUARANTINE 
The focus group’s participants demonstrated that quarantine is an 
emotional issue and the fatality of the agent and the lack of a vaccine will 
significantly impact how they will approach it.  The responses that officers gave 
to the questions regarding quarantine ranged from “shoot to kill” those who 
violate the orders, to “step aside” and let anyone who wants to leave go. Those 
involved in the discussion were adamant about the need for guidance from the 
command staff.  The officers had very little knowledge or understanding about 
quarantine or isolation and the logistics surrounding the use of either.  
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F. LEADERSHIP 
The one constant thread throughout the discussions was the officers’ 
optimistic expectation that somewhere within their department there must be a 
bio-response plan that had not yet been shared with the first responders.  They 
were also concerned about what they perceive as a lack of guidance and 
leadership because no one was discussing these issues with them.  One officer 
said that he learned about the Pandemic and what was going to happen from his 
wife who had seen a special on the Oprah Winfrey Show. Two others learned 
from their wives who were nurses.  The officers want to know what to expect and 
what to do in the event of a bio-attack or a pandemic.  Many voiced a lack of faith 
in their equipment and training, and they desperately want to be able to take care 
of their families.  The officers are willing to come to work, conditionally, and by 
their own admission know that they might die doing their job, but they do not 
want to die because of a lack of training, poor equipment or inadequate 
leadership.   
It was clear from the officers that they want to be respected, heard, and 
allowed input regarding an issue that could dramatically affect them and their 
families, and may even kill them.  Perhaps some agency officials fear opening 
what may be perceived as a “Pandora’s Box” – which might mean talking about 
issues for which they don’t have answers.  However, as the discussions revealed 
the officers are yearning to have someone talk to them and listen to them 
regarding these issues.  After one of the focus groups, one of the officers asked 
the author as he was leaving, “why isn’t anyone doing what we did here today, 
why can’t they just talk to us and answer our questions.”  The officers are looking 
for guidance and leadership regarding an issue that by its very nature creates 
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following are recommendations developed as a result of the 
information gleaned from the focus groups and suggestions from the officers.  
Based on the above summary, there should be at least two main goals of 
government and law enforcement in anticipation of a pandemic or bio-incident.  
From a government perspective, law enforcement officers should be expected to 
respond and be effective during a biological incident.  Yet, the government must 
take steps to create a family-care plan that would result in an environment where 
officers would feel that they could respond to work during the course of a 
biological event.  An additional goal would be to educate and prepare the public 
for a biological incident, with the intent of minimizing fear, panic and lawlessness, 
in order to ensure maximum compliance with quarantine orders and shelter-in-
place requests, utilizing community policing strategies.  Public health, law 
enforcement, fire/rescue personnel and government officials (all stakeholders) 
should consider working jointly in an education process, in order to build 
credibility with the public in anticipation of a crisis. If successful, these efforts 
should result in more police officers responding to work and a public that is more 
compliant, cooperative and self-reliant during a biological incident; this in turn 
would reduce the workload of what is likely to be a naturally depleted law 
enforcement workforce. 
A. THE FAMILY SUPPORT UNIT (FSU) 
The FSU could be staffed with officers who no longer have a work 
assignment as a result of the bio-incident, such as, school resource officers, 
crossing guards, and court officers.  There may also be retired officers, officers 
on restricted duty and, as well as, other volunteers who can assist.  Prior to an 
incident and perhaps annually, all officers should fill out a form that would list all 
of the pertinent information about their family members, to include name, 
address, age, schools, allergies, doctors, special needs, contact information, etc.  
It should be updated as information changes, or at least annually. 
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Training should be given to the officers during in-service training regarding 
how the FSU would work, who would supervise it and who would staff it in the 
event of a bio-incident.  Officers should have input, pre-incident, into what the 
FSU will do, how issues will be handled, etc. The command staff should create 
Standard Operating Procedures for the unit, and make the SOP available to the 
officers.  
The governing body of each agency should consider making 
arrangements to house the officers who agree to come to work, by supplying off-
site sleeping and shower facilities.  As previously discussed in Chapter IV, this 
can be done by contracting with a nearby hotel for a block of rooms in advance of 
an incident that would allow the officers to use the facilities until it is safe for them 
to return home.   
B. HURDLES AND OBSTACLES TO BE OVERCOME 
The thought of a worldwide pandemic or a biological attack, with a 
significant fatality rate, and no vaccine in the early stages is understandably 
frightening to everyone, public service workers included.  Law enforcement 
agencies will need to accomplish the above goals in advance of a crisis in order 
to ensure the presence of a public safety workforce and to minimize the drain on 
that workforce during the crisis.  However, there are those who might find these 
goals to be too lofty or perhaps too ambitious for several reasons, to include: 
some may not believe that there will be a crisis of such magnitude (“crying-wolf” 
or the “chicken little” theory), the turnover rate of police officers will require 
continual updating of the family list so much so that it will be unmanageable, 
there may not be enough staff to ensure the operation of a family support unit, 
most officers live out of county or out of state, and if the government creates a 
family plan for some government workers, why not do it for all? 
These hurdles or obstacles are not insurmountable.  One problem to 
overcome involves knowledge of the situation.  This may be done by a town hall 
meeting for all officers and their families to ensure everyone has an opportunity 
to attend and be heard.  Law enforcement agencies need to discuss the needs of 
officers and their family members, and ways to ensure that officers will be able to 
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respond to work during a biological crisis.  Results from the four focus groups 
included in this study provide strong support that officers would be willing to 
come to work, as long as their families are safe.  This consensus view should be 
communicated effectively to other officers and the local communities.  Many 
officers are likely to decide not to travel back and forth to home during a 
biological crisis so as not to risk contamination of a family member.  Still, local 
communities should have confidence that, if protected, law enforcement 
personnel will do their duty. 
Town-hall-type meetings with family members in attendance are apt to 
develop into lively discussions, since family members may not want the officer to 
go to work at all or to risk potential exposure to the biological agent.  An open 
forum will allow the officers, families and other stakeholders to see for 
themselves that if the families are not properly cared for there is likely to be a 
shortage of officers in a crisis.  Public health officials should be present to assure 
the families that in the event of a biological incident where there is a vaccine 
readily available that the officers and their families will be given priority access.  
The creation of a Family Support Unit (FSU) will only be necessary in the event 
of an incident where there is no vaccine available, and the officers elect not to 
return home out of fear of contaminating their families.  To ensure that officers 
would remain at work, the government would have to demonstrate that the 
families would be taken care of (i.e., food, medical needs, etc).   
In a community town hall meeting the stakeholders and the public could 
discuss the current level of emergency preparedness and assess the status of 
the community households in terms of preparedness.  It is likely that the 
percentage of households that have food, water and medical stockpiles is low.  If 
so, a community meeting would allow the public and the government to 
determine the actual readiness level of a particular community.  A discussion of 
readiness, or lack thereof, could also subsequently lead to a discussion 
regarding the need for the public to be somewhat self-sufficient during a 
biological crisis, highlighting the expected manpower and staffing shortages of 
law enforcement and also allowing for a discussion with the public regarding the 
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meaning of quarantine and shelter-in-place, the expectations of each party 
(government, public and law enforcement), the need for compliance, etc.   
Law enforcement already hosts numerous community meetings with 
homeowner associations, management associations, apartment associations, 
etc. as part of their community policing efforts to address crime issues.  It should 
be relatively easy to incorporate emergency preparedness efforts into these 
meetings by inviting the other stakeholders to answer questions, to explain 
realistic expectations, educate the public on self-reliance, quarantine, etc.  
1. Resources 
As for resource hurdles, during a biological incident (natural or manmade), 
the police department, as well as other departments, will suffer from reduced 
staffing levels due to illness and/or death.  However, depending on the biological 
agent, contagion and fatality factors and government declarations regarding 
assembly and quarantine, there may be segments of law enforcement staff that 
will not be able to perform their daily assignments, yet are well enough to work 
(such as Crossing Guards and School Resource Officers, if schools are closed).  
One or two of the units that will no longer have assignments could be reassigned 
to staff the Family Support Unit (FSU).  
The staff of the Family Support Unit would be responsible to make daily 
contact to assess the needs of the families – if they need food, medicine, etc,; 
food would be purchased and delivered.  The cost of the food and medication 
could be easily withdrawn from the officers’ paycheck, in order to facilitate 
financial issues.  Each officer would have a running account to be paid weekly 
upon receipt of a paycheck.  If the situation were a hardship, because one family 
member could not work and had to stay home with the children, the government 
officials should consider a differential or supplemental.  If a family member 
needed to be taken to the doctor or a hospital, the Family Support Unit would 
transport – wearing the appropriate PPE – or work with Fire/Rescue personnel to 
arrange the transport. 
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The other resource the department will need is a place to house officers 
who are willing to report to work, but are not willing to return home after a tour of 
duty, out of fear of contaminating their family – this would be needed until a 
vaccine became available.  There are hotels in almost every area of the United  
States.   The department should contract now with hotels for rooms for officers 
who are unwilling to return home.  The contract should delineate that the rooms 
would be made available at a discounted government rate upon declaration of a 
Catastrophic Health Emergency.  If/when such an incident were to occur, it is 
very unlikely that the hotels will have many guests at all, so to some degree, 
such a contract would be to the economic advantage of the hotel selected.  Each 
hotel would need a designated trained individual from public health (volunteer 
nurse, etc.) to monitor the environment (i.e., kitchen area where food is prepared, 
guests) to ensure that it remains safe and that anyone with symptoms would not 
be permitted entry or, if already on premises, would need to be isolated 
immediately. 
In regards to educating and preparing the public via community policing 
there would be no additional costs to the government, since the only real 
resource involved would be stakeholders who would meet to prepare and 
educate.  It would require interagency cooperation, scheduling and a sustained 
effort to bring the community up to an acceptable level of preparedness.   
2. Motivation 
Fortunately, government and local communities do not have to overcome 
a lack of motivation to respond among law enforcement officials.  In the focus 
groups, the officers made it very clear what it will take to reinforce their 
professional obligation to respond to an emergency crisis.  In contrast, one needs 
only to look at Hurricane Katrina to see that, if the family members of the officers 
are not safe and taken care of, officers are not likely to report to work.  The 
officers may need assurances from public health, especially the experts, that at a 
minimum a pandemic is a “when” situation not an “if”.  Although it is difficult to 
determine if/where a bio-terrorist attack might take place, it is likely that a 
naturally occurring disease could and may hit any area and officers will still need 
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to report to work.  The issue will be more of convincing them that something will 
happen, not that if it does they will need this program. 
3. Political 
Of course, political hurdles always seem to intervene between even the 
best plans and how people respond during emergencies.  Fortunately, the family 
support unit advocated here does not require an initial outlay of government 
money that might prompt competing political interests.  The actual family support 
unit would be staffed by officers who were already working and could be 
supplemented by volunteers. Contracts for hotels where the officers who did not 
want to return home could stay could be done in advance, in anticipation of a 
date uncertain in the future, triggered by a government declaration of a 
catastrophic health emergency.  However, once trigged the government would 
begin to incur expenses for those officers who elect to respond to work, but are 
unwilling to go home.  Depending on the duration of the event, this could be 
costly for the government, but so could a shortage of police officers.  If handled in 
advance, a negotiated reduced room rate may be a possibility. 
The other issue that the government will struggle with will be how to 
handle the rest of the essential employees of government who must respond to 
work in order for government to function and to meet the needs of the public.  
Government should consider who is essential to maintain continuity of services, 
and perhaps consider a similar plan for them, as well – perhaps part of a 
continuity of operations plan (COOP).   
Public health and law enforcement officers, the general public, and 
particular families will likely support a Family Support Unit Plan.  Fire and Rescue 
personnel already have sleeping, shower and eating facilities within each 
firehouse, so they will not need hotel services, and they already have a family 
support plan in place for USAR members who are deployed to different parts of 
the world to assist in natural and manmade disasters. 
C. TEST METHOD - FSU 
In order to test the effectiveness of a Family Support Plan, counties should 
conduct a pilot initiative, perhaps during a large snow storm.  For example, a 
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county agency could test the plan for 2 days, in order to determine how the 
Family Support Unit performs in regards to contacting and fulfilling the needs of 
the families.  In very bad snow situations, there is no school, so the children will 
be home and the families may need food, water or medicine.  Some officers may 
not be able to report unless arrangements are made to pick them up in 4 wheel 
drive units and they may need to be housed at a local hotel over night – which 
would mirror the biological crisis where officers would refuse to go home out of 
fear of contaminating family members.  What will be difficult to replicate will be 
the level and environment of sickness or death that would come with a biological 
incident.   
Alternately, an agency could conduct a 2-day exercise that would simulate 
a biological incident and have the officers handle the crisis while the Family 
Support Unit handled family care issues – the problem would be that schools and 
work would not be closed and there may not be anyone at home for the Family 
Support Unit to contact or support or it could be conducted on a weekend. 
D. PUBLIC EXPECTATIONS & COMMUNITY POLICING 
Although none of the focus groups recommended a “method” to educate 
the public to ensure that they have realistic expectations, one option is to use 
community policing strategies.  Community policing has offered strategies that 
have proven effective in bringing the police, community and other affected 
partners together to fight crime, make communities safe and improve the quality 
of life in neighborhoods.   
The goal of the community policing effort would be to minimize panic, 
empower the public, speed the healing process post-event and minimize the 
negative effects on the community to whatever degree that is possible.   In a 
crisis situation, people will turn to law enforcement for assistance and guidance.  
Information and knowledge are tools used to reduce panic and fear; both 
empower people and aid them to understand the issues, and allow them to 
combat the problem and permit them to become part of the solution.  This is the 
same premise under which community policing works in regards to fighting crime.  
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If law enforcement were to work in advance of a crisis with public health to 
educate the public on how to shelter-in-place effectively, and how much food and 
water to stockpile then perhaps there will not be a need for forced quarantine.  In 
meetings with the community, law enforcement can work with the organizations 
that naturally occur within the communities, such as civic associations, church 
groups, etc., to create work groups that can assist during a crisis.  These 
organizations generally have a natural internal hierarchy and are accustomed to 
working together and therefore are more likely to be able to work together on 
assigned details during a crisis, similar to a “Neighborhood Watch Program”. 
Working with these community-policing tactics before a biological event occurs 
could bring the stakeholders together to prepare the public to be more self-reliant 
and give them realistic expectations of law enforcement and government. 
E. BIO-RESPONSE PLANS 
Once a plan is released to the officers, the agency/department should 
entertain an audience with the officers and be prepared to hear from them about 
questions, concerns and suggestions regarding that plan.  Agencies should 
consider holding an open forum where officers would be allowed to ask questions 
and share their thoughts, and this will be particularly important if the agency 
expects the officers to buy into the plan.  The officers need to have confidence in 
the plan and those proposing it.  In order to do that they need to understand why 
certain decisions were made and what their role will be in a biological incident, 
and to gain confidence in those who drafted the plan. Confidence in the plan and 
those proposing the plan will help officers to prepare mentally, as well as to 
prepare their families for such an event. 
F. EXERCISE, TRAINING AND PPE 
Obviously, there is a cost involved in the creation and execution of an 
actual exercise, but as one officer suggested perhaps at a minimum, having 
everyone locate and don their equipment annually to ensure they actually know 
where it is and how to don it would be beneficial.  The remainder of the education 
might take place during in-service training – explaining to officers the difference 
between a chemical attack and a biological attack, as well as the difference in the 
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responses to both, and sharing the plan.  This would be a good time to discuss 
the difference between the response to a chemical attack and a biological 
incident, to include a pandemic, discovered days after contamination took place. 
An actual exercise that revolves around a quarantine scenario would 
demonstrate the problems inherent in attempting to contain people against their 
will and would allow the department to observe first hand the officers’ responses, 
sympathies, frustration, etc., since this is an unexplored area for many first 
responders.  Clearly, exercising the plan is important, and failure is something all 
can learn from; however, once the lessons are learned, there should be another 
exercise to determine if previous mistakes have been compensated for and/or 
remedied.  Of the officers who described WMD exercises during the focus group 
sessions, it seems that all ended in failure, and yet there were no additional 
exercises to demonstrate that the deficiencies had been corrected.  Therefore, in 
the minds of the officers who participated in the original exercise, they expect the 
same failed results in a real situation.  To develop confidence in the officers, it is 
imperative that they practice to success.   
G. QUARANTINE 
It was obvious from the focus group discussions that there needs to be an 
open dialogue between first-line responders and command staff regarding 
quarantine –  to understand when quarantine will be used, how it will be enforced 
and what level of force will be used to enforce it.  These discussions should take 
place sooner, rather than later and the department should consider creating a 
policy, in conjunction with public health, regarding quarantine enforcement and 
use of force. 
H. LEADERSHIP 
It is suggested that police officials partner with their public health 
counterparts and meet with the officers and their families.  Consider holding an 
open forum that would allow the officers and their families to be heard and to 
have their questions answered.  The officers should get to know and trust the 
pubic health officials pre-event, and this would be a good place to start.  The 
public health officials are the same people from whom most of the officers said 
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they would want to hear when an incident does occur.  Even if all the answers 
are not known, and clearly there are still many unknowns in the biological arena, 
by opening up a forum for a free exchange of ideas and concerns the command 
staff of the department will be earning the trust of the officers that they will need if 
they expect the first responders to follow them during what may be perceived as 
a chaotic deadly crisis.  
I. CONCLUSION 
The results of this study clearly indicate that the public needs to be 
prepared to have realistic expectations of the government and of law 
enforcement during a pandemic or a bio-terrorism attack, and to prepare to care 
for themselves and others, as well.  If the community can be educated pre-event 
about how to prepare for an emergency and what to expect from government and 
law enforcement, it is possible that the public will be more self-reliant and 
compliant with restrictions on movement (quarantine and/or shelter-in-place) that 
would hopefully reduce the workload of an already understaffed police 
department.  Police, rather than enforcers of quarantines in the face of public 
chaos, can be among the most effective educators, leading public preparedness 
in ways that would minimize the need for government enforced quarantine or at 
least reduce its scale 
Law enforcement, public health and the fire department can work together 
using the community policing concepts to educate the public on what to expect, 
what to stockpile, how to care for each other, how to protect themselves, what 
quarantine is and why it will be necessary.  If options are achieved in advance, 
the result is likely to be that a significant part of the population will be prepared, 
which will in turn reduce the burden on public health, law enforcement and 
government in general, all of which are likely to be understaffed and over taxed 
during a biological crisis. 
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APPENDIX A 
Focus Group Questions 
 
1. Prior to the scheduled time of the Focus Group, I sent around a roster 
asking for the following: 
a. Name  
b. Agency 
c. Job Title 
 
2. All were told: 
 
“Before I ask you anything, I would like to ask each of you for permission 
to tape the conversation.  The tape will be erased when I finish my note 
taking on the session, which I will use to write the thesis.  I will assure you 
confidentiality as far as I am concerned in regards to me and my notes, 
but of course each of you will hear the comments of you colleagues.  So I 
would ask that each person in the room agree to keep confidential the 
comments made by your fellow colleagues.  If you are uncomfortable 
sharing a particular piece of information or your personal thoughts with 
everyone in the room regarding a particular issue, then I would ask that 
you pass it on to me in private after the session.” 
 
3. Opening Questions: 
a. We all have various commitments and obligations in our lives as 
officers.  How much does your family/household life affect your on-
the-job performance? 
 
4. Introduction of the Topic:  I’d like to discuss what might happen in the 
event of a bio-terrorism attack or a naturally occurring pandemic – 
specifically, how might it affect your work, family, colleagues and 
community. 
 
5. Introduction Question: 
a. In the event of a pandemic or bio-terrorism attack– we will 
hereinafter refer to it as a bio-event – what would be your role as a 
law enforcement officer? 
b. In a bio-event – as a law enforcement officer what would be your 
biggest concern regarding your role? 
 
6. Transition Question: 
a. In the event of a bio-event, have made plans and preparations to 
respond and, if so, what are they?  Let’s start with your personal 
plans. 
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b. What plans or preparations, if any, has your agency made in the 
event of a bio-event? 
i. Have you practiced or exercised using plans?  
c. What do you expect the general public to do during a bio-event? 
i. Give some suggestions or examples, and why? 
d. What do you think the general public will expect from you? 
i. Give some ideas or suggestions, and why? 
 
7. Key Questions: 
a. Questions:  In conversations with representatives from other 
jurisdictions there is some concern about who may or may not 
respond in the event of bio-event.     
i. In the event of a bio-terrorism attack or a pandemic, what 
type of issues would you consider, or concerns might you 
have, that would influence your decision whether to respond 
to work or not? 
• Concerns about the welfare of your family? 
• Whether there is a vaccine available? 
• What is the fatality rate of the bio-agent? 
 
b. Definition of terms: Isolation is for sick people contaminated by the 
bio-agent, quarantine is for those who were potentially exposed to 
the agent, are symptom-free, but may eventually get sick. 
 
i. Let me ask you specifically about quarantine during a bio-
even. What is your understanding of how quarantine would 
work in the event of a bio-attack or a pandemic?   
1. Who has the primary authority to declare one? 
2. What would your role be? 
3. What should be the goal of quarantine, and what level 
of force should be used to enforce quarantine? 
4. Under what circumstances do you think lethal force 
should be used during a quarantine situation? 
 
ii. There appear to be situations in which a vaccine may or may 
not be available.  If a vaccine were not available, would that 
change any of your previous responses? 
1. Would you come to work? 
2. What about your family? 
 
c. Now, let’s talk about information during a bio-event: 
 
i. During a bio-event, who do you expect to provide you with 
the authoritative information about what you should do as an 
officer? 
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ii. Who do you expect to hear from outside of your agency?  
Which people would give you the most accurate information?  
Why? 
iii. If you can not connect with you family directly, who would 
you want them to listen to about what to do?  Why? 
 
d. Now, let’s talk about what could and should be done before a bio-
event to change, improve or address some of the issues you’ve 
raised here today. 
 
i. What could/should your agency do to improve: 
1. An officers understanding and preparation?  How? 
2. The public’s expectations? 
3. Ways to avoid the use of force in a quarantine 
situation, if possible? 
4. Communication with officers and the community?   
 
8. Ending Questions : 
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APPENDIX B 
Interview Questions for Mr. Thomas: 
 
1. What level of risk do you think the County is in terms of a bio-incident?  
Has it been a top priority for the County during your term, or have there 
been other priorities that required more attention?   
 
2. What has the County government done thus far to prepare the public for a 
bio-incident?  Who was involved in drawing up the plans or taking the 
action?  Do you believe the County made all the necessary connections 
with emergency responders, law enforcement, public health? 
 
3. Are there plans to prepare the public that have yet to be carried out? 
What are the primary initiatives that still need to be done? 
 
4. What do you think the public will expect from the County government 
during a bio-incident? 
 
5. What do you think the public will expect from public health during a bio-
incident? 
 
6. What do you think the public will expect from LE during a bio-incident? 
 
6. What percentage of the county (population of approximately 1 million) do 
you believe is prepared for a bio-incident with stockpiles of food, water 
and supplies? 
 
7. In a protracted bio-incident, how will the government address continuity of 
life issues, such as food, medicine, water, electricity, sick leave, etc? At 
what level of preparedness do you believe the County is to address these 
issues? 
 
8. What does the government expect of LE in a bio-terrorist attack or a 
naturally occurring pandemic?  Do you expect them to respond to work?  
Why/why not? Vaccine, or no vaccine? 
 
9. What steps has the County taken to discuss preparedness with LE? 
 
10. What if an officer contracts the disease while working?  What protections 
and compensation will the County likely provide?  To the officer, and to 
his/her family? 
 
i. Workman’s Compensation 
ii. Sick Leave 
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iii. Line of Duty Death 
 
11. Has the County engaged in any activities that anticipated what LE might 
do during a bio-incident, and has it taken any steps to ensure they 
respond in a bio-incident? 
 
12. What is your view of quarantine?  Do you anticipate the need for 
quarantine?  Is so, how do you anticipate it working?  Under what 
conditions would you have decided it was not necessary? 
 
13. What is the level of force that should be used to enforce quarantine? 
 
14. Who will be/should be the spokesperson in the event of a pandemic?  A 
bio-attack? 
 
15. What has the government done to prepare businesses for the economic 
effect of a bio-incident? 
 
16. What about essential businesses like grocery stores, pharmacies, etc. – 
do they have coop plans that you/re aware of? 
 
Then Mr. Thomas was briefed regarding the results of the focus 
groups: 
 
LE families must be safe in order for officers to feel that they can come to work. 
 
LE officers feel an obligation to come to work – out of a sense of duty to fellow 
officers. 
 
At least one group suggested that the county consider securing a location where 
officers could bring their families. 
 
If there is no vaccine, again they want to make sure their families are safe and 
then they will come to work.   
 
If their families are not safe, they may not come to work. 
 
Many do not want to go home and risk contaminating their own families. 
 
Very few officers were aware of any plans by their respective agencies regarding 
how to respond in a bio-incident or what the role of the officers would be in such 
an event. 
 
Only 3-4 officers had participated in an actual bio-terrorism exercise, and most of 
those involved vaccine dispensing sites and clinics. 
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Just about every officer expects that there will be chaos and that the public will 
panic during a bio-terrorism attack or a pandemic.  Most reference the public’s 
response to Katrina. 
 
Most officers believe that the public will expect LE to supply direction and 
answers to all their questions, whether law enforcement related or not, and that 
911 services will be overwhelmed. 
 
Almost every officer conceptualized of a bio-incident or pandemic similar to a 
chemical attack or spill - they would encircle it – there would be a hot zone, a 
cold zone and decontamination.  They would wear their issued PPE – level C 
suits.  They had difficulty conceptualizing of an incident where the bio-agent had 
been dispersed within the community well in advance of the first signs of 
symptoms.  They also did not see an incident last very long – again, they viewed 
it more like a chemical spill. 
 
Quarantine – LE believes that it is initially fire/rescue’s responsibility to handle 
and the LE has a support role.  Officers were fairly well split in regards to the 
amount of force to be used to enforce quarantine - depending on the fatality rate 
of the agent; some believe deadly force is warranted while others seem to 
sympathize with those being held in quarantine. 
 
They believe the public needs to be educated now regarding what to expect from 
LE and how quarantine will work, to reduce the chances of panic and chaos. 
LE wants to receive pertinent health information through trusted officials, many 
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